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QUEER THEORY BY MEN 
IAN HALLEY* 
In this essay I present parts—not all—of my argument that it would be 
good for left pro-sex intellectual and political work, including feminist work of 
this kind, if people doing it could occasionally Take a Break from Feminism.1  
The essay has four main parts and an Appendix.  In Part I, I attempt a minimal-
ist definition of feminism as it is now practiced and produced in the United 
States, and draw some rudimentary distinctions among various forms of femi-
nism that fall within this definition.  The basic idea here is that a minimalist 
definition of feminism actually maximizes the range of projects that can be de-
scribed as feminist, and makes it harder to Take a Break from them.  In Part II, I 
give an extremely cursory genealogy of feminism, gay-identity politics and 
queer theory.  In Part III, I analyze two examples of queer theory by men.  These 
are close readings; by that means I attempt to find with some precision the tra-
jectory of these postmodernizing, sex-positive, left analytics of sexuality and the 
precise points of their debt to and departure from feminism.  The basic idea here 
is to travel deeply into the domain that could be called queer theory and to start 
the journey as far as possible from feminism; it seemed to me likely (and I think 
it turned out to be the case) that my two male authors—one a gay man, the other 
a straight one—would place themselves in relation to feminism rather than in it 
and would therefore make manifest some conceptual and/or political possibili-
ties for Taking a Break from Feminism (and would also give me the pleasure of 
identifying publicly with them and disseminating their work).  In Part IV, I give 
 
 * Ian Halley wishes to thank Duke Law School for giving Janet Halley the opportunity to de-
liver this paper as the Brainerd Currie Lecture in November 2002, and the Duke Journal of Gender Law 
& Policy for allowing him to engage with the distinguished commentators in this volume.  Queer 
Theory at Duke Lives.  Janet Halley is Professor of Law, Harvard University. 
 1. This essay is part of a book in progress, SPLIT DECISIONS: FEMINISMS, GAY IDENTITY POLITICS 
AND QUEER THEORY IN THE LEGAL MANAGEMENT OF SEX (forthcoming) [hereinafter HALLEY, SPLIT 
DECISIONS].  Some parts of the argument, and of the text included here, also appear in the following 
essays: Janet Halley, Take a Break from Feminism, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Karen Knop ed., 
forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Halley, Take a Break from Feminism]; Roundtable on Subversive Legacies, 
with Karen Engle, Elizabeth Schneider, Vicki Schultz, Adrienne Davis and Nathaniel Berman, 12 TEX. J. 
WOMEN & L. (forthcoming 2004); Brenda Cossman, Dan Danielsen, Janet Halley & Tracy Higgins, 
Gender, Sexuality and Power—Is Feminist Theory Enough?, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601 (2003).  I am 
grateful to the organizers of and participants in all the conferences underlying these volumes, and 
particularly to Cossman, Danielsen and Higgins for their extremely astute contributions to the Co-
lumbia symposium; the last part of this paper could not have been written without them.  Thanks 
also to Leo Bersani and Duncan Kennedy for reading my readings of their work with such engaged 
intelligence.  For their gorgeously intense engagement with and against the piece, thanks to Jane 
Gaines, Ranjana Khanna and Robyn Wiegman.  For struggling through and with it without surcease, 
special thanks to Nathaniel Berman, Dan Danielsen, David Kennedy, and Duncan Kennedy.  
Thanks, finally, to audiences, colleagues, friends, lovers and opponents, too numerous to mention, 
who have helped me frame the overall project. 
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a close reading of a fascinating legal decision, Twyman v. Twyman,2 following a 
“re-reading protocol” I have developed that allows highly divergent theoretical 
hypotheses to generate highly divergent re-readings of legal texts.  The point 
here is to see whether there can be any conceptual upsides to re-reading the case 
deploying hypotheses that Take a Break from Feminism.  For legal readers this 
section should provide whatever “payoff” they might be able to derive from all 
the preceding analytic work.  Finally, in the Appendix I deduce from the experi-
ence of writing Part III (and of reading in the field more broadly) some maxima 
for queer theory, feminist and otherwise. 
I.  A MINIMALIST DEFINITION OF FEMINISM, AND SOME DISTINCTIONS 
Here are some observations about how feminism defines and taxonomizes 
itself in the United States today.  I am not claiming that these attributes are es-
sential in the sense that they are absolute or natural; rather that they are essen-
tial in the sense that current conventions seem to require them as a disciplinary 
matter. 
First, to be feminism, a position must make a distinction between M and F.  
Different feminisms do this differently: some see men and women, some see 
male and female, some see masculine and feminine.  While “men” and 
“women” will almost always be imagined as distinct human “groups,” the other 
paired terms can describe many different things: traits, narratives, introjects.  
However a particular feminism manages these subsidiary questions, it is not “a 
feminism” unless it turns in some central or core way on a distinction between 
M and F. 
Second, to be a feminism in the United States today, a position must posit 
some kind of subordination as between M and F, in which F is the disadvan-
taged or subordinated element. At this point feminism is descriptive and not 
normative: M>F. 
And third (here is the normative turn), feminism opposes the subordina-
tion of F.  It frames itself as a justice or emancipatory project.  As between M and 
F, and possibly because M>F, feminism carries a brief for F. 
I think these attributes are noticeable in virtually every form of feminism in 
the United States today, and will treat them as definitional—as essential in an 
Aristotelian sense.3 
Beyond that, feminisms can be distinguished in many ways.  It has been 
helpful to me to suppose that about half of feminism in the United States today 
concerns itself with male power and female subordination in sexuality, and that 
the other half concerns itself primarily with reproduction, care work, work in 
the paid economy, and related matters.  Of course these overlap, but people 
 
 2. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993). 
 3. In Cossman et al., supra note 1, Higgins and Cossman convinced me that the current range 
of feminist possibility includes feminism that turns on M/F and that carries a brief for F, but that is 
not a subordination theory and does not definitionally require M>F.  Instances of feminism like that 
are extremely rare; I think if you push hard enough, almost any currently available feminist text will 
eventually manifest its commitment to M>F.  I attempt to articulate a feminism that doesn’t go there 
in Part IV of this article, before Taking a Break from Feminism altogether.  See infra, at IV. 
071504 HALLEY.DOC 9/17/2004  9:27 AM 
 QUEER THEORY BY MEN 9 
seem more or less comfortable with treating them as the “phyla” of this intellec-
tual kingdom. 
Further, across the full range of these issues, feminism often concerns itself 
in very sustained ways with powers that operate not across the M/F distinction, 
but along the many distinctions that we refer to when we speak of “class,” 
“race,” and “empire.”  We could call the results socialist, antiracist, and post-
colonial feminisms.  I like to think of these as “hybrid” feminisms, because they 
set out to examine (at least) two incommensurate modalities of power at once. 
So assuming I can proceed with those givens, I will also note that, on the 
sexuality side, feminism finds itself in alliance with and in conflict with other 
left/liberal/progressive projects that take sexuality and power as their domain 
of operation but that often lack a primary focus on M/F and often do not pri-
marily concern themselves with M>F.  Chief among these are gay identity poli-
tics, transgender and transsexual politics, sex liberationism that is not primarily 
feminist, and queer theory.  In this essay I will examine some aspects of the rela-
tionship between feminism as a theory about sexuality and power, and queer 
theory. 
At this point (and always in the hybrid feminisms), a person framing a con-
ceptual, descriptive, normative, and/or political project can choose between 
converging the two or more modes of conceptual or social organization or diverg-
ing them.  That is, we could decide that normatively it would be terrible to have 
a theory of homosexuality that was not ultimately feminist, or a feminism that 
did not wholly encompass our theory of homosexuality; we would then be aim-
ing for complete convergence.  Or we could say that it is better for some reason 
to have some division or autonomy or even conflict between the two projects; 
we would then be aiming for some degree of divergence. 
My overall goal in this discussion is to make a case for the proposition that 
divergence in left thinking about sexuality and power can get us some concep-
tual gains that seem unavailable from convergence.  Specifically, I think we 
don’t always need feminism in order to have meaningful left projects about 
sexuality.  I hope to show that left/liberal/progressives can Take a Break from 
Feminism in their theorizing, their alliance formation, and their activism from 
time to time, and that the results can be (not that they must be—only that they 
can be) good, not only for projects that fall outside the domain of feminism, but 
for feminism, too. 
There are many reasons to think this is a bad idea, and there is a large lit-
erature, that will certainly continue to grow, on the upsides and downsides.  I 
am working on several papers and a book that will take up some of the more 
normative, consequentialist and discursive dimensions of this fascinating de-
bate.4  In this essay I hope it will be permissible to circumscribe my goal: I want 
to provide an elaboration, in a somewhat high degree of detail, of some concep-
tual moves that may be possible only if one pursues a divergence between femi-
nism and queer theory as I imagine it.  Some, not all; and a, not the.  To be sure, if 
the instances of divergence that I expose here seem valuable, perhaps we will 
decide we want to find or produce more of them.  The argument is not that the 
 
 4. See note 1, supra. 
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convergence of feminism with queer theory is impossible or undesirable; it is 
merely that divergence is both possible and possibly highly valuable. 
II.  FEMINISM 101 AND BEYOND 
A. Male/Female Model and Cultural Feminism 
By far the most brilliant, comprehensive and forceful thinker about sexual-
ity in American feminist legal theory for the last twenty years has been Catha-
rine A. MacKinnon.  Her formulation—which, for shorthand, I will call the 
“male/female model”—has become the paradigmatic understanding of sexual-
ity in sexual-subordination feminism in the United States.  The chief alternative 
source of descriptive and normative insights is cultural feminism. 
It took me a long time to understand how profoundly MacKinnon altered 
several of her basic positions between 1982–1983, when Signs published two ar-
ticles by her that fully deserve the name “radical feminist,”5 and the mid-1980’s, 
by which time she was fully engaged as a feminist legal activist.  As I show 
elsewhere, Feminism Unmodified, the 1987 volume on which most readers rely for 
a restatement of MacKinnon’s thought tout court, significantly modifies MacKin-
non’s position as of 1983 on a whole array of crucial points.6  All the feminists 
who want to resist the influence of the Late MacKinnon should consider 
whether their own reasons for resistance appear as MacKinnon’s own position in 
the Signs articles.  As I see it, many of them do. 
The Early MacKinnon argued that male dominance was not merely a social 
subordination of women by men, but an almost total capture of reality and 
knowledge themselves by male dominance and female subordination.  Male 
dominance and female subordination did not merely rank the genders: they pro-
duced them (that is, the very existence of men and women may well derive from 
this domination), and, because they also produced the eroticization of domina-
tion by everyone so constituted, they also produced the consciousness by which 
we might apprehend these arrangements.  Our very desire and our very modes 
of knowledge are inhabited throughout by the epistemology of this power struc-
ture.  Men emerge as objective knowers, and women as known objects; and this 
turns us all on and is our basic grammar of action: man fucks woman, subject 
verb object.  Feminism is a project in quest for women’s point of view, which, be-
cause it is already constituted as its subordination, is not only a profoundly de-
ferred but also a deeply problematic starting place. 
On this understanding, male dominance was so complete that no aspect of 
gender could be distinguished, ultimately, from rape.  MacKinnon did not claim 
that every act of heterosexual intercourse was a rape.  Rather, she made the 
 
 5. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 
7 SIGNS 515 (1982) [hereinafter MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Femi-
nism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983) [hereinafter 
MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence]. 
 6. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).  Part of my argu-
ment that this book represents a significant alteration in MacKinnon’s position is set forth in Janet 
Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 80 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley 
eds., 2002).  Other elements of the analysis will appear in Split Decisions, supra note 1. 
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much more interesting and subtle claim that, because of the constitutive role of 
male dominance and female subordination in producing all the existing people, 
in generating the very rudiments of our knowledge and desire, there is no one 
alive who can distinguish meaningfully between rape and not-rape. 
I call the result a male/female model because those terms map the entire 
field of analytic possibility for this feminism.  Male power produces female sub-
ordination, which is gender, which is the eroticization of this hierarchy; all of 
this generates rather than arises from the conceptual and social difference be-
tween men and women.  The model is highly convergentist: it causes MacKin-
non to say that, if a man rapes a man, the latter has been sexually dominated 
and is therefore feminized.  The homosexuality of the event does not elude, but 
must rather merge into the male/female model. 
All of this led the Early MacKinnon to embrace a critique of the state and of 
the law.  The state and the law were, she proposed, male—not in the sense that 
men ran them, but in the sense that they fully recapitulated male ontological and 
epistemological powers and were in a sense therefore fully dependent on female 
subordination to be what they were.  The state could not be used against some-
thing so constitutive of it as male power; and female subjectivity, which was a 
constitutive element of male power, provided no way out of the dilemma.  
Criminalizing rape would merely legitimate all the dominance in sexuality that 
escaped the definition of the crime; deciding particular rape cases on the basis of 
the woman’s instead of the man’s testimony merely recapitulated the sub-
ject/object, subjectivity/objectivity distinction of male dominance; asking trial 
courts to find that some acts of heterosexual intercourse were “rape” imputed to 
others a legitimacy feminism should deny them.  Insight into equality and the 
political will to seek it could come only from consciousness-raising—the painful 
search for a transformation of consciousness achieved at the most micro level. 
It was not too long before MacKinnon significantly departed from some of 
these claims.  She retained the structural view of male domination: it is hori-
zonless; it produces men and women; it relates them to each other in gender, 
which is eroticized domination.  But by the mid-1980s she claimed to know 
many, many things, and to know them because women’s point of view had dis-
closed them to her without distortion.  Rape, sexual harassment, domestic 
abuse, pornography—all the lurid catalog of sexual nastiness—these are the core 
elements in male domination.  Rights against them enforced by the state would 
be feminist.  Women who disagree with any part of this line, MacKinnon was 
willing to suggest, have been co-opted by male consciousness.  It is possible to 
deploy the Early MacKinnon against the Late.7 
It also took me a long time to realize that MacKinnon has consistently re-
fused to be a cultural feminist in the sense I use that term. To be sure, 
male/female-model and cultural feminism have a lot in common.  Both insist on 
M/F, on M>F and on carrying a brief for F.  Both are structural subordination 
projects.  Both see equality as the almost-exclusive vocabulary for their justice 
ambitions.  But while MacKinnon focuses our attention on the unjust male 
 
 7. I am not saying that one or the other is more “right,” or that MacKinnon’s work is somehow 
less compelling just because it has evolved.  I myself vastly prefer—in fact am wildly enthusiastic 
about—the Early MacKinnon, but that is a political decision, not a logical or moral necessity. 
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domination of women through power, cultural feminism emphasizes the unjust 
male derogation of women’s traits or points of view or values or experiences 
through male-ascendant normative value judgments.  If MacKinnon’s equality pro-
ject is a massive attack on power as it constructs everything, cultural feminism is 
an effort to transvalue values—to find women’s or feminine values (like care, or 
intersubjectivity, or particularity) and to restore them to a place at least equal to, 
probably superior to, the corresponding male values (like self-interest, or objec-
tivity, or generality) that have unjustly pushed their way to the top.  Cultural 
feminism is not nearly as likely as MacKinnon’s thinking to be structural in 
form: after all, women exist as exemplars of a better way; and if we could put 
them in charge, or make men more like them, things would get better fast.  But it 
is equally ambitious on the social dimension it cares about: MacKinnon would 
like to get men by the balls because she does not believe their minds and hearts 
can follow; whereas cultural feminism has detailed plans for their hearts and 
minds.  Cultural feminism is a fighting faith seeking the moral conversion of a 
little less than half the human race. 
Both the male/female model and cultural feminism support women’s iden-
tity politics.  That is, they see women as a human identity group with a common 
problem—subordination to men.  Though cultural feminism roughly speaking 
divides its attention between the cultural re-valuation of women’s distinctive re-
lationship to care and the cultural re-valuation of women’s distinctive engage-
ment in sexuality, when it focuses on sexuality, cultural feminism agrees with 
the male/female model in characterizing male sexuality as a vast social prob-
lem.  Women are the client base of these feminisms, and women are the people 
they would help first if they had to pick.  M/F, M>F, and carrying a brief for F. 
B. Gay Identity Politics, Sex-Positive Feminism, Postmodernism, Queer Theory 
At the same time that these sexual-subordination feminisms were develop-
ing themselves as important elements in American legal thought and practice, 
another identity-based movement became important in the United States: homo-
sexuals.  They (we, actually) borrowed a lot of ideas about how to have an iden-
tity movement from the black civil rights movement (as did feminism), but the 
focus of my story here is the way the gay movement borrowed ideas about hav-
ing a subordinated-sexuality movement from feminism.  Roughly speaking, gay 
identity politics in the United States can be construed to take forms resembling 
the common elements of the male/female model and cultural feminism: homo-
sexuals are a real social group subordinated in sexuality to heterosexuals; justice 
requires ending that form of social ranking.  Moreover, gay identity movements 
tend to take either a MacKinnon-like form, looking with a wary eye for traces 
everywhere of heterosexual dominance and seeking its overthrow; or a cultural-
feminist-like form, emphasizing the moral virtues of homosexuals and seeking 
their normative inclusion in the center. 
To be almost unbearably reductive, three things happened “then.”  First, 
AIDS.  In the United States, AIDS first emerged as an epidemic among gay men.  
For about ten years starting in the early 1980s, the death toll—affecting a youth-
ful population then fomenting ecstatic politics of sexual liberation and otherwise 
expecting to live for decades—was a huge social fact.  Social conservatives and 
defenders of heterosexual virtue quickly stigmatized the epidemic as the prod-
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uct of “gay male promiscuity”—a move which put to gay-identity movements 
the question whether they could continue to affirm sexual liberation as a defin-
ing goal.  Gay centrism moved towards marriage rights, and gay liberationism 
moved towards sexual liberty and the world-making (bathhouses, elaborate 
sexual subcultures, and so on) that might sustain it; the movement split, intellec-
tually and politically. 
Second, MacKinnonite feminists and cultural feminists began in the early 
1980s to converge on some fairly specific targets of activism—rape and other 
forms of direct violence, pornography, intergenerational sex, sex between social 
unequals (for example, boss/secretary, teacher/student), sex in public—as lev-
erage points for the de-subordination of women.8  They formed important alli-
ances with social and religious conservatives morally opposed to these practices, 
and together these allies made significant progress in articulating and enforcing 
legal sanctions against a wide array of sexual relations.  This simultaneous turn 
“to the state” and “against sex” broke alliances between MacKinnonite and cul-
tural feminists on the one hand and radical, sexual-liberationist feminists on the 
other.  The result was the “sex wars.”  In them, the radical, sexual liberationist 
feminists precipitated abruptly and with great energy out of male/female-model 
and cultural feminism, and, looking back to the radical feminist sources from 
which MacKinnon’s early work emerged, formed a distinct “sex-positive” femi-
nism specifically in struggle with Late-MacKinnonite and cultural feminism. 
Where sex-positive feminism and sex-liberationist gay male politics came 
into contact with each other, there was a third element: postmodernism arrived 
on the United States intellectual scene, bringing with it a whole array of new (to 
the left/liberal United States intelligentsia) brainwaves.  The antifoundational, 
libertine, irrationalist, ecstatic, antimoralistic tendencies in postmodernism pro-
vided powerful new insights that seemed to promise a return to critical and 
radical potential.  The postmodern critique of the enlightenment subject brought 
the already uneasy fit between identity politics and liberal individualism into 
question.  The postmodern emphasis on subject formation rather than brute 
domination as the really trenchant application of power to persons called into 
question the subordination paradigm.  The postmodern critique of deontological 
moral claims and, in particular, of the dignified liberal individual as historical 
and political artifacts called into question the sufficiency of moral outrage and 
individual or group dignity as a basis for political work.  Where identity and 
subordination and moralism come under left critique, we find a rich brew of pro-
gay, sex liberationist, gay-male, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and sex-practice-
based sex-radical, sex-positive, anti-male/female model, anti-cultural-feminist 
political engagements, some more postmodernizing than others, some feminist, 
 
 8. For some moments in MacKinnon’s turn to the state, see Indianapolis Ordinance, 1984, in IN 
HARM’S WAY: THE PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS HEARING 438 (Andrea Dworkin & Catharine A. 
MacKinnon eds., 1997); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
(1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321 (1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 13 (1993); Catharine A. MacKinnon & Ronald Dworkin, Pornography: An Exchange, in 
THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 3, 1994, 47-48, reprinted in FEMINISM AND PORNOGRAPHY 121-
29 (Drucilla Cornell ed., 2000). 
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others not.  The term “queer theory” is often invoked to describe this complex 
array of projects. 
I argue here that a very rich and valuable piece of the resulting politics 
Takes a Break from Feminism.  This is not at all to deny or to describe in any 
way the feminist possibilities that emerge in the astonishingly complex political, 
intellectual and theoretical array I describe as queer theory.  My goal in these 
pages is simple (though I admit the analysis is somewhat detailed): I want to test 
for conceptual and political openings that suspend feminism at the intersections 
of postmodernism, gay male politics, pro-sex leftism, and so on. 
Often this move has been misunderstood to be anti- or post-feminist. This 
misunderstanding is a very interesting symptom of some of the current weak-
nesses, as I see them, in feminism, and in other related papers I devote consider-
able attention to the argument structures that support it.  Here I will only say 
that Taking a Break from Feminism is anti- or post-feminist only if feminism re-
quires convergentism on all matters relating to sexuality; that is, if M/F, M>F, 
and carrying a brief for F must be the ultimate ground of all work in this wide 
and politically, historically and intellectually riven domain.  The premise of this 
criticism of my project must be that feminism, far from requiring only M/F, M>F 
and carrying a brief for F, also requires that those terms (or perhaps some of 
them) are structurally definitive of all of sexuality.  That is a huge claim, and I 
would be surprised if many feminists were willing to follow it to its structuralist 
premises. 
III.  QUEER THEORY BY MEN 
Onward then.  I have selected two texts, both written specifically from the 
point of view of male authors who insist on their sexual interests in the face of 
feminist denunciation.  The homologies between them are even more remark-
able given the facts that one articulates a gay male, the other a heterosexual 
male, sex-positive position, and that one is structured around a crisis in norma-
tivity while the other reveals a crisis in decision.  I am referring of course to Leo 
Bersani’s 1987 essay Is the Rectum a Grave?,9 and Duncan Kennedy’s 1992 article 
Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domination.10  The former is 
widely read as canonical queer theory; the latter is—sorry, folks!—the only so-
phisticated legal analysis of American sexual regulation that I am tempted to call 
queer. 
A. Is the Rectum a Grave? 
In this celebrated essay, Bersani reconfigured Stonewall-era gay male sex-
ual liberation for the era of AIDS.  He asked gay men whether their then-
overwhelmingly-distinctive exposure to the epidemic would lead them in the 
direction of gay-identity liberalism of the sort exemplified in legal studies by the 
 
 9. Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, 43 OCTOBER 197 (1987), reprinted in AIDS: CULTURAL 
ANALYSIS, CULTURAL ACTIVISM 197 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988). 
 10. Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 1309 (1992), reprinted in DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 126 (1993).  I will refer 
to the essay throughout as Sexy Dressing. 
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work of William Eskridge (marriage, monogamy, and equality as equal respect) 
or back to the bathhouse; whether they would disavow or find new affirmations 
of male/male promiscuity, what Bersani would later call male “love of the 
cock,”11 gay men’s yearning for male/male anal sodomy, and the peculiarly in-
tense new association of sex with death.  Bersani urged the second, sex-
affirmative option. 
In affirming sex, however, Bersani performed an unusually strongminded 
embrace of abjection.  The essay begins12 with angry reflections on the intense 
homophobic mobilization against gay men that attended the early years of the 
AIDS epidemic in the United States (it is helpful to remember that people seri-
ously proposed “chemical castration” and quarantine of gay men to protect “the 
general population” from the virus) and finds both in them and in gay male sex-
ual desire a homophobic and misogynist association of gay male anal receptivity 
with female sexual subordination.  Bersani is interested to show that, in misog-
yny, in anti-gay-male homophobia, and in gay male erotic longing, the vagina 
and the anus are figured as sexually insatiable and as animated erotically by a 
desire for annihilation.  Bersani observes an agreement between Michel Fou-
cault, who at one point affirmed that “[m]en think that women can only experi-
ence pleasure in recognizing men as masters,”13 and MacKinnon, who decried 
“the male supremacist definition of female sexuality as lust for self-
annihilation.”14  He then adds his own affirmation that this lust is an aspect of 
gay male eroticism.  In these moves, Bersani takes MacKinnon’s gay-male-
feminization argument to fever pitch.15  He fully accepts—as a pro-gay male de-
scription of “the hygienics of social power”—the proposition that “[t]o be pene-
trated is to abdicate power.”16 
 
 11. LEO BERSANI, HOMOS 103 (1995). 
 12. I am going to analyze Is the Rectum a Grave? in the present tense—the Bersani who “speaks” 
in these pages is the Bersani implied by the text as understood by me—so it is all the more important 
to note not only that it was written before the critique of feminism, offered by Judith Butler and Eve 
Sedgwick almost simultaneously in 1981, but also that, to the extent that it relied on and confirmed 
M/F, it was in some fundamental sense heterosexual.  See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 27-35 
(1990) [hereinafter BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE]; EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE 
CLOSET 22-23 (1990).  I argue in Split Decisions, supra note 1, that Butler represents the route from this 
crisis back into feminism; that Sedgwick represents a route I describe here as Taking a Break from 
Feminism; and that both routes are largely constitutive of gender-related queer theory as practiced 
so far.  Bersani reformulated and extended his 1987 argument in light of Sedgwick’s and Butler’s 
work and related developments in feminism, postmodernism and elsewhere, and also expressed a 
different understanding of the political stakes of his project, in his 1995 book HOMOS, see generally 
BERSANI, supra note 11, and he further reformulated his understanding of the self and its masochism 
in Sociality and Sexuality, 26 CRITICAL INQUIRY 641 (2000). 
 13. Michel Foucault, Sexual Choice, Sexual Act: An Interview with Michel Foucault, 58 SALMAGUNDI 
10, 21 (1982). 
 14. MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 8, at 212 (1989). 
 15. Bersani’s images are pretty gripping.  In both the Victorian representation of female prosti-
tution and the contemporary representation of gay male transmission of HIV, “[w]omen and gay 
men spread their legs with an unquenchable appetite for destruction.”  Bersani, supra note 9, at 211.  
Homophobia was motivated to exile hemophiliac Ryan White because it supplanted the image of his 
childish innocence with “the infinitely more seductive and intolerable image of a grown man, legs 
high in the air, unable to refuse the suicidal ecstasy of being a woman.”  Id. at 212. 
 16. Id. 
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That acceptance manifests a decided appetite for paradox and the problem-
atic.  Bersani admires in MacKinnon’s thought precisely her “indictment against 
sex itself.”17  He treasures in her work a capacity to hold the power in sex under 
a steady, unblinking gaze: 
[MacKinnon and Dworkin in their antipornography analysis and activism] have 
given us the reasons why pornography must be multiplied and not abandoned, 
and, more profoundly, the reasons for defending, for cherishing the very sex 
they find so hateful.  Their indictment of sex—their refusal to prettify it, to ro-
manticize it, to maintain that fucking has anything to do with community or 
love—has had the immensely desirable effect of publicizing, of lucidly laying 
out for us, the inestimable value of sex as—at least in certain of its ineradicable 
aspects—anticommunal, antiegalitarian, antinurturing, antiloving.18 
What could Bersani be thinking?  How could one have a normative vision of 
human life (or any part of it) that wants it to be “anticommunal, antiegalitarian, 
antinurturing, antiloving”? 
The argument is both descriptive and prescriptive, and I will attempt to lay 
it out as if these were distinct “parts” (in Bersani’s essay they are not distin-
guished).  The descriptive argument has wonderful simplicity.  Bersani claims 
that we all already do have such a vision, that it animates an important part of 
our erotic desires, that it cuts sex off from politics as usual in a deeply radical 
way, and that we shouldn’t shoot the messenger.  To anchor this argument, Ber-
sani draws from Freud the idea that the very possibility of human selfhood 
emerges in the “shifting experience that every human being has of his or her 
body’s capacity, or failure, to control and to manipulate the world beyond the 
self.”19  And it runs even deeper than that: the “human being” who aspires to a 
relationship of control over “the world beyond the self” experiences “his or her 
body” as ambiguously the self and/or the world: “the sexual . . . involv[es] . . .  
the source and locus of every individual’s original experience of power (and of 
powerlessness) in the world: the human body.”20  Sexuality broadly conceived is 
a special domain of human experience, one in which a profoundly inchoate, 
constitutive, infantile but inescapable narrative of the unstable wish both for 
mastery and dissolution is continually in play, never subject to closure.  Bersani 
thus insists that the self has a double relation to mastery: it both comes into be-
ing through, or as, mastery (over the body, over the social world); and does so at 
the expense of an ideal state of dissolution into the body, into the social world, 
which it retains as a memory of its origin and goal.  And in it the penis has a dis-
tinctive symbolic relation to mastery.  “The penis” does not bestow mastery on 
men—far from it; “the idea of penis envy describes how men feel about having 
one”21—but rather presents—for gay male and heterosexual interactions at 
least—a bodily correlate especially capable of representing (perhaps sometimes 
by mocking) the desire of every self for mastery over the body and of every em-
bodied self for mastery over the world. 
 
 17. Id. at 214. 
 18. Id. at 215. 
 19. Id. at 216. 
 20. Id. at 221. 
 21. Id. at 216. 
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And yet (or should I say, perhaps, “and so”?) there is also dissolution, and 
that is a distinctive part of sexual experience.  The “jouissance of exploded lim-
its,” the deep savoring of “that sexual pleasure [which] occurs whenever a cer-
tain threshold of intensity is reached, when the organization of the self is mo-
mentarily disturbed by sensations or affective processes somehow ‘beyond’ 
those connected with psychic organization”—for Bersani these are so character-
istic of the orgasmic aim that he is led to propose that “[s]exuality . . . may be a 
tautology for masochism.”22  It is precisely phallocentrism which has engineered 
discursive limits which make it almost impossible for our publicly respectable 
selves to do anything with that last sentence but disavow it: 
Phallocentrism is . . . not primarily the denial of power to women (although it 
has obviously also led to that, everywhere and at all times) but above all the de-
nial of the value of powerlessness in both men and women.  I don’t mean the 
value of gentleness, or nonaggressiveness, or even of passivity, but rather of a 
more radical disintegration and humiliation of the self.23 
Obviously this argument depends heavily on, and to some extent reenacts, 
male/female-model feminism.  Most explicitly, Bersani lays hold of MacKinnon 
as to a lifeline.  On sexuality, on dominance, and on desire, he is MacKinnon all 
over again: he fully embraces her theory of sexuality as power, and as constitu-
tive of the self through the modalities, not of Kantian subjectivity, but through 
and as sheer domination; he pushes us back to her early idea that in the erotici-
zation of domination we experience the unspeakable thrill of encountering our 
own metaphysical and experiential dissolution.  He does not see gender in any-
thing like the same way, however: the strong link he draws between the pene-
trable vagina and the penetrable anus leaves implicit one feature of gay male 
erotic life that escapes MacKinnon’s resentful analysis of gay male eroticism.  
For Bersani the “love of the cock” (the cock that one has, that one wishes one 
had, that that man over there has or might have) simply never goes away.  And 
MacKinnon was a subordination-theory structuralist throughout her manage-
ment of the male/female model, whereas for Bersani the project is to fracture the 
structural totalism of male/female model feminism and, picking among the 
pieces, to redeem for euphoria some of the most apparently irredeemably dys-
phoric elements of her sexual world. 
I have been tempted to say Bersani “flips” the male/female model, but, be-
cause of this fracturing, his procedure is something more akin to bricolage.24  Still, 
within that fractured frame, we could say Bersani offers us a classic example of 
the “perverse” in queer argumentation: there is a peculiar torque, a strong and 
nasty reversal, in Bersani’s agreement that phallocentrism is a social calamity 
because it blocks men’s access to the “humiliation of the self” enjoyed by 
women.25  But even if fragmentary and self-consciously paradoxical, his affirma-
tion of MacKinnon’s feminist analysis of the eroticization of domination always 
reverses (and thus reveals) his normative judgment: not bad but good. 
 
 22. Id. at 217. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, The Science of the Concrete, in THE SAVAGE MIND 1, 1-33 (1966). 
 25. For my own modest etymology of “perversion” as a term of approbation, see Janet Halley, 
In Memoriam: David Charny, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2232 (2001). 
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Though initially, therefore, Is the Rectum a Grave? seems utterly opposed to 
and “outside” cultural feminism—one of the pleasures of reading it, for me, is 
imagining the indignation and offense it probably arouses in cultural feminist 
readers—it repeats the central trope of cultural feminist moralism.  There is 
something good in sex, something that has been devalued, and the reform pro-
ject is to revalue it back “up”—if not “over” its competitor value, at least “equal” 
to it.  That is, cultural feminism and Bersani are engaged in serious combat over 
the value of degradation and human erasure in sex: cultural feminism says these 
have been overvalued because they have been allocated exclusively to women; 
Bersani replies that they have been vastly undervalued through their association 
with women.  But Bersani and cultural feminists agree, it seems, that the combat 
is waged on the field of “value”—a field which MacKinnon pushed over and 
beyond the horizon of her understanding. 
Is there anything left that is not feminist in Bersani’s invocation of sexual 
erasure?  I can think of two things.  First, Is the Rectum a Grave? intervenes in a 
specifically gay male political crisis, to push interests that are not necessarily 
those of women, gay or straight.  These are the interests of gay men: on their be-
half, Bersani reproaches Foucault for leaching gay male identity of its sexual 
specificity.26  It really does matter for Bersani whether one is a man or a woman, 
gay or straight; this is not because these identities are a source of authenticity 
and dignity, but because they provide distinctive inroads into the dissolution of 
the very self that would bear them.27  Thus, although Bersani concedes that male 
masculinity may be “socially determined,” he insists that it is nevertheless of 
crucial importance to the projects of male sexual desire and, even more to the 
point, of male/male sexual desire;28 it provides for men a peculiarly intense vo-
cabulary in which to seek the frenzy of dissolution.  So the essay Takes a Break 
from Feminism in the everyday political sense that it is not primarily “for” 
women. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, at every crucial turn Bersani claims his the-
ory of sexuality for “men and women.”29  We have already encountered the vir-
tual equation, in his psychic economy of dissolution, of the gay male anus with 
the heterosexual female vagina.  Gay men, and men generally, have full psychic 
 
 26. In THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME ONE and numerous essays and interviews, Foucault 
evinced what I like to describe as a “post-identitarian yearning”—a desire to understand and inhabit 
sexuality without the strictures of identity—male or female, gay or straight—and without the stric-
tures tying it to crescendo narratives teleologically aimed at fucking and at orgasm.  See generally 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME ONE: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1976). The shorthand for this desire, both descriptive and utopian, 
is the term “bodies and pleasures,” under which Foucault organizes some of his ideas about resis-
tance at the end of Volume One.  Id. at 157, 159.  I argue in SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 1, that the deep 
response we have seen in U.S. queer theory to this aspect of Foucault’s work animates the “trouble” 
over identity which can be found in Butler and Sedgwick’s work referred to above, see supra note 12; 
controversy over it pervades the queer field.  Bersani’s argument here is an early entry in an intellec-
tual and political rumble that’s not over yet. 
 27. In HOMOS, supra note 11, at 31-76, Bersani later reaffirmed the distinctive status of male and 
gay male sexuality especially with respect to the penis, masculinity, misogyny, etc., and resisted 
Sedgwick’s and Butler’s queer anti-identitarianism. 
 28. Bersani, supra note 9, at 209. 
 29. Id. at 222. 
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and political access to the abjection in sexuality which feminists attribute (Ber-
sani would say, with veracity, and enviably) to women (though men reach it 
through broken denial and women through denied appetite), because access to 
that abjection is a distinctive virtue of sexuality generally.  He conversely also in-
sists that women, heterosexual men, and gay men too, have access to the will to 
dominate that introduces the self into its being.  The crux of the theory—one he 
derives from his most important nonfeminist theoretic source, Freud—seems to 
be the infantile psyche confronting, not a sexed or gendered body, but “the” 
body as an object of erotically crucial but unsustainable mastery—”the sex-
ual . . . involv[es] . . . the source and locus of every individual’s original experience 
of power (and of powerlessness) in the world: the human body”30—and the em-
bodied self confronting “the world” with the same anxious need.  In this narra-
tive, gender is temporally and analytically secondary; primacy is given to a 
complex associating a string of mobile dyads (self/body, embodied self/outside 
world, mastery/dissolution); and annihilation though the anus or the vagina is 
annihilation still.  This formulation definitely Takes a Break from Feminism in 
the sense that it stakes sexuality to something other than M/F. 
My exposition of Bersani’s argument thus far has limited itself to its affir-
mation of a shamed desire and a shamed pleasure because they are a desire and 
a pleasure: it’s as if he had said “we desire it, and love it when we get it, so it’s 
good.”  But Bersani goes further, to lay out a moral politics that justifies this de-
sire.  This will seem paradoxical to readers familiar with the essay, because in 
one sense Bersani offers a dark view of the value of sexual desire precisely in 
order to renounce any possibility of its smooth incorporation into liberal politics 
and into subordination-theory identity politics of all kinds (feminist, gay and 
race-based).  In this Bersani is an extreme “divergentist,” insisting that the form 
and value of power in sexual abjection are unique to it, nonhomologous to and 
analytically nontransferrable to other forms of power.  The central goal of Is the 
Rectum a Grave?, as Bersani persistently notes, is to figure out “the extremely ob-
scure process by which sexual pleasure generates politics.”31  He rejects gay-
subordination theories of the sexual precisely for what I dub their convergentism.  
He is particularly anxious to scotch gay utopian dreams that “sexual inequalities 
are predominantly, perhaps exclusively, displaced social inequalities”:32 because 
sexual experience is primordially about the struggle of the self for mastery over 
the body and the world, it cannot derive its paradoxes of power from the social 
subordinations, “as if . . . [it] were, so to speak, belatedly contaminated by 
power from elsewhere.”33 
Bersani thus argues that the power that infuses sexuality is quite discon-
tinuous with social power of the sort emphasized in left-multicultural subordi-
nation theories.  The dark side of sexual experience, especially perhaps 
male/male sexual experience, is different.  He takes it as a given that blacks as a 
group, women as a group and the poor as a group are socially subordinated to 
whites, men and those with material means; he affirms as his own the normative 
 
 30. Id. at 221 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. at 208. 
 32. Id. at 220. 
 33. Id. at 221. 
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ambition to resist these social hierarchies.  But he carefully un-performs what 
has become a classic left trope at this point in the analysis, of asserting that one 
writes on behalf of “sexual minorities” implicitly “like” blacks, women, and the 
poor and thus smoothly solidarized with them.  This is a convergentist impulse, 
and Bersani resists it.  And in the course of this refusal he achieves an unusually 
high number of politically incorrect bon mots: far from serving as an example of 
“Whitmanesque democracy,” gay male bathhouses are (were?) “one of the most 
ruthlessly ranked, hierarchized, and competitive environments imaginable”;34 
the parody of women and femininity that pervades gay male camp, far from 
subverting gender norms, is “a way of giving vent to the hostility toward 
women that probably afflicts every male.”35  Male homosexual pleasure does not 
track directly into antisubordination politics:  “To want sex with another man is 
not exactly a credential for political radicalism”; AIDS surprised gay men, the 
vast majority of whom otherwise expected to live their lives “without modifying 
one bit their proud middle-class consciousness or even their racism”;36 in sug-
gesting otherwise “we have been telling a few lies.”37 
Instead, Bersani forces to a limit the split between the social and the sexual: 
“AIDS,” [Simon] Watney writes, “offers a new sign for the symbolic machinery 
of repression, making the rectum a grave.”  But if the rectum is the grave in 
which the masculine ideal (an ideal shared–differently–by men and women) of 
proud subjectivity is buried, then it should be celebrated for its very potential 
for death.38 
Wow—the rectum—it’s dark in there.  So dark that Bersani launches a critique of 
Foucault and MacKinnon for being too sunny!  In MacKinnon’s utter and com-
plete disaffirmation of the power that constitutes male dominance, female sub-
mission and their subsumption in and as the sexual, Bersani sees an implicit af-
firmation of sex without it: “What bothers me about MacKinnon and Dworkin is 
not their analysis of sexuality, but rather the pastoralizing, redemptive inten-
tions that support the analysis.”39  And he rejects Foucault’s “bodies and pleas-
ures” ambitions as no less pastoral, recommending instead an enthusiastic 
plunge into the specific intensities of those eroticized parts of the body—
especially the penis, anus and vagina—from which Foucault wished to “untie” 
sexuality.40  I think Bersani here misses the horizonlessness of male dominance 
in MacKinnon’s Signs articles, the critique of consciousness there—in sum the 
radicalness of the theory (though he may refer to some ameliorative pronounce-
ments in her later, law reform mode).  And on the Foucaultian side, he misses 
the procedural, almost heuristic, quality of the “bodies and pleasures” agenda 
suggested by Foucault in his own deep critique of consciousness at the end of 
 
 34. Id. at 206. 
 35. Id. at 208. 
 36. Id. at 205. 
 37. Id. at 206. 
 38. Id. at 222 (quoting SIMON WATNEY, POLICING DESIRE: PORNOGRAPHY, AIDS, AND THE MEDIA 
126 (1987)). 
 39. Id. at 215. 
 40. Id. at 219–20. 
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Volume One (though he does refer to some quite complacent formulations Fou-
cault elsewhere offered the gay press.) 
Much more plausibly, the pastoralizing models of sexuality he’s concerned 
about come from the gay identity project in its “cultural-feminist” mode.  There, 
and also in some early sex-wars defenders of lesbian sadomasochistic sex, Ber-
sani locates “a hidden agreement about sexuality as being, in its essence, less 
disturbing, less socially abrasive, less violent, more respectful of ‘personhood’ 
than it has been in a male-dominated, phallocentric culture.”41  The flip side of 
Bersani’s failure to notice the deeply critical stance taken by the Early MacKin-
non and in Foucault’s Volume One is his indifference to his own repetition of the 
basic argumentative trope of cultural-feminist gay identity arguments.  Those 
arguments basically urge that the oppressed, highly distinctive sexuality, how-
ever despised and subordinated, is actually a site of equal, possibly superior vir-
tue.  Though neither the Early MacKinnon nor the Foucault of Volume One could 
imagine sexual politics in these terms, Bersani’s essay pervasively does so.  The 
shattered self strives to capture political virtue, a paradoxical argumentative tra-
jectory that produces Bersani’s feminism at its most sublime.  Here’s how it 
happens . . . 
The self-shattering which Bersani finds in our sexual intensities is to be 
valued as a political project because it gestures to a state of being in which the 
self/other structure of social life is suspended and the political will to dominate 
rendered inarticulate and helpless.  The social and the political inevitably involve 
domination or at least the struggle for it, but sexuality has a fleeting existence 
prior to and free of them: “For it is perhaps primarily the degeneration of the sexual 
into a relationship that condemns sexuality to becoming a struggle for power.”42  
MacKinnon, not Foucault: social power is puissance not pouvoir, bad not neutral 
(or good).  In seizing it, the self inserts itself inescapably into the mutually con-
stitutive pairing of purity and brutality, virtue and sheer domination, arrogating 
one and alienating the other.  Whereas we could try to see “[t]he self [as] . . . a 
[mere] practical convenience,” instead we allow it to be “promoted to the status 
of an ethical ideal, [where] it is a sanction for violence.”43  The basic structure of 
this idea is deconstructive: in the articulation of brutality through its opposite 
(purity), of domination through its opposite (virtue), and vice versa, the self 
makes itself both a moral force and a deadly one. 
But as we have seen, that deadly force is precisely what Bersani proposes 
we should grant his dark vision of sexual jouissance and his own moral advocacy 
for it.  He argues that the very self respect which, in liberal theory, is supposed 
to check social subordinations in the sexual domain—homophobia, misogyny 
and sexual moralism being his examples—actually produces them and every 
form of power struggle.  They cannot be traced to mastery or submission, but to 
the self which would transcend its own relentless problematic.  Sexual abjection 
with its momentary disorientation of the self offers to interrupt this generation 
of social dominance through the self, and constitutes a vast critique of political 
and social power.  Indeed, gay male abjection is situated with enviable precision 
 
 41. Id. at 215. 
 42. Id. at 218. 
 43. Id. at 222. 
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exactly at the nexus of masculinity and heterosexism and thus may offer redemp-
tion not only from homophobia, but also from sexism: 
An authentic gay male political identity therefore implies a struggle not only 
against definitions of maleness and of homosexuality as they are reiterated and 
imposed in a heterosexist social discourse, but also against those very same 
definitions so seductively and so faithfully reflected by those (in large part cul-
turally invented and elaborated) male bodies that we carry within us as perma-
nently renewable sources of excitement.44 
The claim is only ostensibly gay supremacist; more accurately, it is abjection su-
premacist and ultimately convergentist at the highest level.  It bids to be a 
sweeping critique of social dominance, of which male dominance of women be-
comes only one example, and thus to be more feminist than feminism. 
This explains why Bersani’s critique of social violence does not undermine 
even a little his own deployment of social violence.  His analysis of homophobia, 
racism, sexism, and pastoralism are full of certainties, moral denunciations, and 
mandatory affirmations.  The convergence of the political with the moral be-
comes important early in the essay, and, as I’ve indicated, basically adopts a cer-
tain cultural feminist style of political antisubordination thinking.45  The essay’s 
moralistic violence emerges early, as Bersani attempts to evade the strictly para-
doxical implications of its delightful first line: “There is a big secret about sex: 
most people don’t like it.”46  Later in the essay he will need all the paradoxical 
power of Freud’s theory of the self, constituted in the tension between mastery 
and dissolution, to explain the aversion packed into desire.  But here in the 
opening pages, Bersani attempts to distinguish benign from malignant aversion 
to sex: we should affirm our own dysphoric experience of sex, especially 
male/male homosexual sex, because it is benign; and condemn the social mani-
festation of it in anti-gay sentiment, because, although propositionally identical, 
the latter is malignant.  A fully queered and critical engagement with this prob-
lem would admit, I think, that the very distinction between benign and malig-
nant is constitutive of sexual moralism and cannot be relied on to resolve the 
problematics of shamed desire.  But that is not Bersani’s approach here.  Instead, 
he proceeds as though, faced with the homophobia that animated “the general 
population” in the early days of the AIDS crisis, one can easily decide what to 
condemn and why: “morally, the only necessary response to all of this is rage.”47  
Gay men in the HIV crisis are “[f]requently on the side of power, but powerless; 
frequently affluent, but politically destitute; frequently articulate, but with noth-
ing but a moral argument . . . to keep themselves . . . out of the quarantine 
camps.”48  Bersani never actually articulates the moral argument, but the indig-
nant urgency of his tone strongly suggests he doesn’t have to because it’s obvi-
 
 44. Id. at 209. 
 45. Bersani evidently became critical of this moment in his work; the moves I am about to de-
scribe are almost completely absent from Homos, which frames the relationship between the erotic 
and the political in much more oblique and minoritizing terms.  See BERSANI, supra note 11. 
 46. Bersani, supra note 9, at 197. 
 47. Id. at 201. 
 48. Id. at 205. 
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ous.  Implicit in this kind of argumentation is a threat: if you don’t also already 
know the moral argument, you must be very very anti-gay. 
Bersani tracks certain forms of feminism in another way as well.  One of the 
most breathtaking tropes in MacKinnon’s structuralist rhetoric, as well as in 
those dark cultural feminisms that take patriarchy as a transhistorical truth, is 
the simple word “and.”  Rape and pornography and sexual harassment and do-
mestic abuse and prostitution and “trafficking in women” and marriage and 
makeup and the Boy Scouts—they are all mere instances of the structure of male 
dominance and are basically all alike.  Following Judith Butler, we could desig-
nate this basic trope the copula;49 following Sharon Marcus we could call it the 
fallacy of the “collapsed continuum.”50  It is the rhetorical form of many of 
MacKinnon’s most breathtaking statements: “Socially, femaleness means femi-
ninity, which means attractiveness to men, which means sexual attractiveness, 
which means sexual availability on male terms.  What defines woman as such is 
what turns men on.”51  The tendency is, if anything, more pronounced in her 
later work.  For instance: 
 
 49. Judith Butler, Against Proper Objects, in FEMINISM MEETS QUEER THEORY 1, 12 (Elizabeth 
Weed & Naomi Schor eds., 1997) [hereinafter Butler, Against Proper Objects] (“MacKinnon’s view of 
feminism is one which makes free use of the copula in which causal relations are elliptically asserted 
through the postulation of equivalences, i.e. within the structures of male dominance, conceived ex-
clusively as heterosexual, sex is gender is sexual positionality.”) 
 50. Sharon Marcus, Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention, in 
FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 385, 389 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992).  Marcus offers 
a critique of the feminist modeling of a rape on a  “collapsed continuum” which 
links language and rape in a way that can be taken to mean that representations of rape, 
obscene remarks, threats and other forms of harassment should be considered equivalent 
to rape. . . .  In a “continuum” theory which makes one type of action, a verbal threat, im-
mediately substitutable for another type of action, sexual assault, the time and space be-
tween these two actions collapse and . . . rape has always already occurred. . . .  [But] oc-
clud[ing] the gap between the threat and the rape . . . [risks closing] the gap in which 
women can try to intervene, overpower and deflect the threatened action. 
Id. 
 51. MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory, supra note 5, at 530-31.  The quoted passage sums up an 
even more capacious list: 
If the literature on sex roles and the investigations of particular issues are read in light of 
each other, each element of the female gender stereotype is revealed as, in fact, sexual.  Vul-
nerability means the appearance/reality of easy sexual access; passivity means receptivity 
and disabled resistance, enforced by trained physical weakness; softness means pregnabil-
ity by something hard.  Incompetence seeks help as vulnerability seeks shelter, inviting 
the embrace that becomes the invasion, trading exclusive access for protection . . . from the 
same access.  Domesticity nurtures the consequent progeny, proof of potency, and ideally 
waits at home dressed in saran wrap.  Woman’s infantilization evokes pedophilia; fixation 
on dismembered body parts (the breast man, the leg man) evokes fetishism; idolization of 
vapidity, necrophilia.  Narcissism insures that woman identifies with that image of herself 
that man holds up: “Hold still, we are going to do your portrait, so that you can begin 
looking like it right away.”  Masochism means that pleasure in violation becomes her sen-
suality.  Lesbians so violate the sexuality implicit in female gender stereotypes as not to be 
considered women at all. 
Socially, femaleness means femininity, which means attractiveness to men, which means 
sexual attractiveness, which means sexual availability on male terms.  What defines 
woman as such is what turns men on. 
Id. 
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Because pornography affects all women and connects all forms of sexual subor-
dination, so does [MacKinnon’s favored discrimination-based legislative attack 
on pornography]. . . .  The way subordination is done in pornography is the way 
it is done in prostitution is the way it is done in the rest of the world: rape, bat-
tering, sexual abuse of children, sexual harassment and murder are sold in pros-
titution and are the acts out of which pornography is made.52 
To make distinctions is to be fooled by male dominance; as between the various 
items assembled here, there is no difference that any living human being has an 
adequately “raised” consciousness to discern. 
Borrowing the copula from MacKinnon’s structuralism (or perhaps from 
cultural feminism, which, in its stronger “patriarchy” forms, is equally prone to 
it53), Bersani collapses into a single monolithic oppression quite disparate and 
possibly distinguishable political events.  In the most sweeping example, he ar-
gues that, when federal public health officials proposed mandatory reporting 
and registration of the name of anyone who tested positive for HIV, they dem-
onstrated that they “might not find the murder of a gay man with AIDS (or 
without AIDS?) intolerable or unbearable”; and that makes them just like Ger-
man citizens who, in the runup to the Holocaust, “failed to find the idea of the 
holocaust unbearable”; and that makes mandatory registration of HIV-positive 
patients or, indeed, any other policy initiative regulating rather than benefitting 
the HIV-positive population just like the Holocaust: “by relegating the protection 
of people infected with HIV to local authorities, [officials] are telling those au-
thorities that anything goes, that the federal government does not find the idea 
of camps—or perhaps worse—intolerable.”54  Let us leave aside the Holocaust 
analogy, which is a convergentist trope to be sure, but not exactly my focus just 
now: the thing I’m interested in here is the “collapsed continuum,” the copula, 
within pro-gay-male argumentation.  Along that axis, a policy decision to have 
local rather than federal officials decide HIV policy is the same as a policy deci-
sion to establish a registry (a federal one, we might note) listing people who test 
positive for HIV is the same as a willingness to murder an HIV-positive gay man 
is the same as a willingness to murder any gay man is the same as a willingness to 
put all gay men in camps and thus is the same as a willingness to kill them all in a 
genocidal paroxysm. 
This instance sounds hectic today only because the panic that produced it 
has subsided.  However maladroit it would now seem to deploy the copula in 
this way on behalf of Unitedstatesean gay men, the trope is still very much in 
vogue in some feminist and some antiracist circles, and may even have migrated 
with HIV to Africa and Asia to affect some postcolonial discursive projects.  I 
will defer to the last section of this paper my argument, which I merely want to 
flag now, that there are the descriptive, political and strategic advantages to 
framing social hypotheses that dissolve, rather than massify and structuralize 
oppression, and that deployment of the copula foregoes them.  I hope it suffices 
 
 52. See MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 31. 
 53. For an example of cultural feminist deployment of the copula, see part IIIB., infra, particu-
larly note 72 and accompanying text. 
 54. Bersani, supra note 9, at 201–02 (emphasis omitted). 
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for now to point out that this trope could not emerge, at least in this way, in the 
more fully critically queer passages of Bersani’s argument. 
What Bersani’s political descriptions borrow from feminism, they also re-
turn to it, affirming representations of gender and power that, I have argued, 
were soon to be contested by sex-positive, sex-radical, postmodernizing and 
queer feminisms (and that are not endorsed in Homos, where Bersani explicitly 
engaged Butler and Wittig and their postmodernizing explosion of the female 
subject).55  The main gesture here is to put outside the reach of critique not only 
subordination-theory, minoritizing framings of gay male existence in the AIDS 
crisis, but similar representations of women’s existence under male dominance.56  
One form of it is what you might call the a priori gesture: “timing” political sub-
ordination theory so that its conclusions have been reached before the present 
analysis begins (“I mention these [examples of malignant homophobia] . . . sim-
ply as a reminder of where our analytical inquiry starts”);57 another is to state its 
claims as obvious (it would “of course be obscene” to claim that gay men are 
more oppressed than poor blacks).58  With respect to women and feminism, this 
gesture produces an affirmation of the complete, wall-to-wall domination of 
women by men as an assumption that is also true: “the hostility towards women 
that probably afflicts every male (and which male heterosexuals have of course 
expressed in infinitely nastier and more effective ways)”;59 phallocentrism, 
though “not primarily the denial of power to women . . . has obviously also led to 
that, everywhere and at all times”;60 gay men should not imitate heterosexual mo-
nogamy, that “unrelenting warfare between men and women, which nothing has 
ever changed.”61 
Listening to that 1987 voice now, I have to say how glad I am that its social 
authority in left sexuality theory has been so substantially eroded. 
That sense of relief, however, leaves me with a hard question.  What is a 
politically engaged queer theoretic take on sexuality going to do instead?  How 
could Is the Rectum a Grave? be rewritten today?  My own idea is that the distinc-
tively queer features of the paper—its willingness to affirm sexuality as carrying 
an appetite for deep threats to integrated selfhood, its willingness to lose touch 
of propositional ethical logic to do so, its plunge into a profoundly irresolvable 
problematic of desire, and its fragmentation not only of the self but of the gen-
dered self—can be maintained in politically acute work. 
In order to move, ever so tentatively, in the direction of this object, I’d like 
to extrapolate from the “queer” dimension of Is the Rectum a Grave? some repre-
sentations of sex, gender and power that might lodge well under the descriptors 
“queer feminism” and “queer thought that Takes a Break from Feminism.” 
 
 55. See BERSANI, supra note 11, at 37–52. 
 56. And of race, although Bersani is much more willing to probe and question antiracist than 
feminist presumptions. 
 57. Bersani, supra note 9, at 199 (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. at 204 (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. at 208 (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. at 217 (emphasis added). 
 61. Id. at 218 (emphasis added). 
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Here goes.  Queer feminism might claim, without necessarily denouncing or 
romanticizing it, women’s subordination in the eroticization of domination.  It 
might suspend normative judgment and merely descriptively insist that it’s 
there.  This could lead to a descriptive re-reversal of gender: female masculinity 
could become just as crucial as the feminine abandon Bersani attributes to a gay 
man, “legs high in the air, unable to refuse the suicidal ecstasy of being a 
woman”62 —oops, I mean, “of being a gay man.”  The status of female femininity 
with respect to power could become quite uncertain; female masochism, fur-
thermore, could be understood sometimes to be “on top.”  If this logic were part 
of lesbian sexual politics, it would necessarily involve an exploration of the de-
gree to which female masculinity is drag or deadly serious.  Such an exploration 
might be even more necessary, and more capable of new uncertainties, if our 
starting point were heterosexual women’s engagement with men.  In either case, it 
might well contribute to Judith Butler’s programme for feminist queer theory: 
“when and where feminism refuses to derive gender from sex or from sexuality, femi-
nism appears to be part of the very critical practice that contests the heterosexual ma-
trix. . . .”63  There would be some clear gains for the critique of MacKinnon and 
cultural feminism: the attribution to women, as to men, of the psychic stamina to 
sustain experience this challenging could be deployed against the feminist and 
social conservative images of women as “always rapeable,” structurally vulner-
able, and perpetually in need of some kind of protective custody.  Whether the 
representation of women’s relationship to power in sex would be uniformly 
“good for them” would be really hard to decide, however.  So much would de-
pend on so much. 
Let’s try the same thought experiment in a queer mode that Takes a Break 
from Feminism.  In this queer mode, it is the confrontation of the self with its 
embodiment, with its will to power over and its utter lack of control over that 
object, the body; its pleasurable and frightening ability to wield itself as embod-
ied to control the world, and the utter, persistent fragility and reversibility of 
that project (the world against the body, against the self) that is erotic; both as-
sertion and dissolution are compellingly familiar, mutually contingent, and con-
stantly yielding to one another in the body’s very capacity for experience of it-
self as human; gender is secondary, derivative, and (however highly useful as a 
vocabulary) definitive of exactly nothing in the tremulous project of the self.  In-
deed, if the implicit masochism of the orgasmic aim involves a will to be shat-
tered, disoriented, erased, then gender would be one of the things that one lost 
track of.  This hypothesis could help explain lots of things that don’t make much 
sense under the descriptive mandates of the male/female model and cultural 
feminism: for example, the fact that masculinity and femininity have fairly rich 
vocabularies for “getting wasted” in this way; and the hunch that male and fe-
male persons probably have, at least in theory, equal access to the power and 
danger of such experience.  This idea would seem, moreover, to deliver on But-
ler’s agenda for a feminist queer theory—”when and where feminism refuses to de-
rive gender from sex or from sexuality, feminism appears to be part of the very critical 
practice that contests the heterosexual matrix”—but with the (possibly perverse) 
 
 62. Id. at 212. 
 63. Butler, Against Proper Objects, supra note 49, at 12. 
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additional feature that it need not also be feminist!  Whether it would connect to 
other politics in good ways would depend on whose welfare you cared about, 
and (given the deep problematic into which the theory places the very idea of 
sexual welfare) what you would do about the vast increase in uncertainty. 
At this point the queer theoretic contribution of Bersani’s gripping essay to 
a reformulation of the politics of sex and power kind of runs out.  My next ex-
ample, Duncan Kennedy’s Sexy Dressing, coming at some of the same issues in 
sexuality from an explicitly regulatory and legalistic perspective and with the 
aid of Butler’s postmodernizing feminism, can perhaps help light a few more 
steps along the way. 
B. Sexy Dressing 
Duncan Kennedy dedicated Sexy Dressing to Mary Joe Frug, a legal scholar 
murdered in 1991 as she was finishing her distinctively pro-sex, postmoderniz-
ing and feminist book Postmodern Legal Feminism.64  By all accounts Frug was a 
very sexy dresser. 
Moreover, Kennedy wrote Sexy Dressing after and, in a sense, into, a deci-
sive rupture among left intellectuals in legal studies which Robin West (a key 
figure in legal cultural feminism) had described six years earlier as the “CLS-
FEM Split.”65  Critical Legal Studies, or CLS, lives of course; this essay is an ex-
ample of it.  But the CLS conference is dead.  Active in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the CLS conference was, I’m told (I was elsewhere at the time) a vital and 
internally riven intellectual and social movement among left law teachers; both 
Kennedy and West played prominent roles in it.  As I’ve suggested in my gene-
alogy of intra-feminist conflict in Part I, at about this time across many domains 
of feminist encounter, and certainly within CLS, male/female model and cul-
tural feminism took the turn away from radicalism and critique and towards 
law, certainty, and the rigorous regulation of sexual life in the name of women; 
and sex-positive and postmodernizing feminism emerged to resist this turn.  
Towards the end of her life, I understand, Frug was a powerful figure mediating 
the conflict.  Long before her death, West and Kennedy had come to represent it. 
In 1985 Kennedy had published a short essay entitled Psycho-Social CLS in 
which he analyzed the relationship between erotic desire and intellectual poli-
tics inside the CLS conference.66  He said some things in that paper which West 
thought to be so bad that, unless he retracted (and other men in CLS renounced) 
them, CLS could no longer be thought “a congenial atmosphere for feminist 
work, nor . . . a healthy environment for women, and women should therefore 
get out.”67  What were those things? 
First, there is desire—between men and women and also between men and be-
tween women. . . . 
 
 64. MARY JO FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM (1992). 
 65. Robin West, Deconstructing the CLS-FEM Split, 2 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 85 (1986). 
 66. Duncan Kennedy, Psycho-Social CLS: A Comment on the Cardozo Symposium, 6 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1013 (1985) [hereinafter Kennedy, Psycho-Social CLS]. 
 67. West, supra note 65, at 91. 
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Second, there is the historical fact of the oppression of women by men. . . . 
Third, there is feminism, a self-conscious reaction against the oppression of 
women. . . . [T]he internal structure of the [CLS] conference is unmistakably re-
flective of the larger patriarchy.68 
Kennedy then addressed the sum, as it were, of these three parts: in CLS, more 
powerful men and less powerful women had erotic relations, relations of desire, 
often in the roles of mentor/mentee; and the feminism of many women in the 
conference was, from the perspective of the men, both a welcome and a frighten-
ing element of those relations.69 
West’s criticism of Kennedy’s 1985 paper is a short classic in cultural femi-
nism.  She construed Kennedy’s “First, there is desire” as a claim that heterosex-
ual desire is natural and thus beyond political criticism, and as a claim that, be-
cause it is reciprocal it is also equal, and thus (again) beyond political criticism.70  
Against those claims (not directly observable in Kennedy’s argument), she pro-
posed that desire was movable, and that men and women in CLS should direct 
theirs outside the conference: “We can, after all, eroticize other things.”71  And she 
predicated this call on a counterclaim that heterosexual desire in the conference, 
far from being equal, was seamlessly of a piece with patriarchal domination.  
The erotic desire of more powerful men and less powerful women in CLS was 
an eroticization of domination precisely fitted, via the copula, into male domina-
tion everywhere: 
The societal and institutional commitment to the notion that powerless women 
naturally desire powerful men—that heterosexual desire is reciprocal, symmet-
rical and natural even though it is between concededly unequal partners—
accounts for this society’s inability to “see” marital rape as rape rather than as 
“bad sex.”  It accounts for the societal belief that women who don’t desire men 
are “frigid.”  It accounts for the societal inability to see that sexual harassment in 
the workplace is indeed harassment rather than the soft “personal” touch of an 
office.  It accounts for the societal inability even to consider the possibility that 
teenage pregnancy is a function of teenage male coercion rather than a breaking 
of societal “taboos” against “natural” promiscuity.  It accounts for the belief that 
rape victims asked for it.  It accounts for the belief that pornography causes no 
harm other than an imagined and illusory offense to a Victorian sensibility.  It 
accounts for the belief that wolf whistles and sexual jeers on the streets are com-
pliments rather than assaults.72 
Indeed, it accounts for Kennedy’s ability “to bemoan the demise of behavior 
which many feminists and many more women now understand to be sexual 
harassment on the job, plain and simple.”73 
West here offers us a convenient synopsis of the cultural feminist politics 
against which Sexy Dressing was written.  She categorically precludes, largely on 
 
 68. Kennedy, Psycho-Social CLS, supra note 66, at 1020. 
 69. Id. at 1020-23. 
 70. West, supra note 65, at 87-88. 
 71. Id. at 91. 
 72. Id. at 89. 
 73. Id. at 90. 
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moral grounds, any possibility of women thriving in their subordinated desire 
for men who have power over them; she seamlessly merges the resulting power 
hierarchy into an M>F structure; she knows exactly what women’s interests in 
that situation are and announces them with indignant finality.  Sexy Dressing is 
in one sense a response to every element of West’s declamation of Kennedy for 
his actual historical engagement in intellectual politics as a powerful heterosex-
ual man. 
Sexy Dressing takes women’s sexy dress as a semiotic system that registers, 
in subtle and dynamic ways, the degree to which women are able to enter as 
strong, self-interested bargainers into sex and sexually fun symbolic play with 
other women and with men.  He argues from a position of highly identified 
“erotic interests”—his own—which he bluntly characterizes as those of a hetero-
sexual white middle-class male who wants there to be women (on the street, in 
the media, at work) who can afford to be erotically thrilling to him.  And he at-
tempts to design an algorithm for deciding how to regulate sexual abuse (rape, 
sex harassment, domestic violence, date rape, sexual intimidation of women by 
men) to maximize women’s safe, and minimize their endangered, engagement 
in sexy dressing, sexually meaningful play, and sex with men.  The project is 
unequivocally pro-sex. 
To me, moreover, it is distinctly “queer” in its analysis of sexuality, power, 
and knowledge.  It fragments and “flips” the male/female model in a way that 
is highly reminiscent of Bersani’s operation in Is the Rectum a Grave?; however,  
because its reasons for doing so emerge not from Freud, but from social theory, 
the resulting pattern of sexual complexities is more explicitly political.  Even 
more than Bersani’s partisanship on behalf of gay men, to which most feminists 
defer out of a convergentist sympathy with minoritized, subordination-theory 
formations generally, Kennedy’s stance has been scandalous among feminists; it 
is difficult to get feminist students even to read the essay.  His decisions to write 
explicitly from the standpoint of “a straight white male middle-class radical,”74 
to take into account the erotic interests of a person so situated, to turn postmod-
ernizing feminism against the male/female model, and nevertheless to declare 
that “I do not think of myself as a feminist,”75 severally or together, somehow 
absolutely disauthorize Kennedy in many feminist circles.  So be it.  It’s not 
feminist.  It Takes a Break from Feminism.  Moreover, seeing it as “queer” in-
stead—because of its embrace of male heterosexual erotic interests—provides 
deep satisfaction to my own ambition that queer work would be able to Take a 
Break not only from these feminist strictures, but also the homo- and bi-
supremacy that more or less go with the term so far. 
Like Bersani, Kennedy embraces the male/female model, and relies heav-
ily, again like Bersani, on MacKinnon for a set of understandings of sexuality 
and power.  He affirms that men (even those who don’t abuse women) eroticize 
women’s subordination, suspects that women do too, and acknowledges multi-
ple male interests in the underenforcement of rules against men’s sexual abuse 
of women.  Moreover, he attempts a more-or-less complete description of those 
interests: they include not only the free range some men find within this margin 
 
 74. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 126. 
 75. Id. at 129. 
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of underenforcement—the tolerated residuum of abuse—to abuse women; but 
also the reduction, for all men, of the risk that they will be falsely or mistakenly 
accused of abuse, and the considerable cultural respose and bargaining advan-
tage all men gain by being able to shift the burden of taking precautions regard-
ing abuse to women.76  He shares MacKinnon’s view that the eroticization of 
domination provides a pervasive language and power form for the relations be-
tween men and women.  He takes it as a given (and also as a personal observa-
tion) that women suffer wide-reaching social subordination because some men 
abuse some women. 
But Kennedy departs substantially from the structuralist premise of the 
male/female model as MacKinnon frames it.  Recall what that structuralism 
means in MacKinnon’s thought: the eroticization of domination precipitates 
women as women and men as men; it produces women as subordinated to men, 
by definition.  In MacKinnon’s thought, this is not only a social, but also a meta-
physical and ontological achievement, so that no human consciousness is free of 
it.  Sexuality as women’s subordination and men’s superordination pervades 
human reality, such that rape is merely the paradigmatic form of heterosexual 
interaction; and it pervades human consciousness, such that no one is in a posi-
tion to say for sure that a given act of “voluntary” or “ordinary” heterosexual 
intercourse (or watercooler flirtation) is not precisely homologous to what we 
call rape.  The copula, the decision to attribute to the woman who files a com-
plaint the “truth” of all women. 
Kennedy splits from MacKinnon by substituting politics imagined in eco-
nomic terms, for what he would later call her “paranoid structuralism.”77  There 
are several moving parts to the resulting analytic approach, many of which are 
rare to the vanishing point in the queer cannon and in liberal feminist work, so I 
will attempt to spell them out in some detail. 
First, law in Kennedy’s formulation is not nearly as mystified, monolithic, 
temporally smooth, unilaterally productive, or normative as it is in the 
male/female model or in cultural feminism.  Rules governing sexual abuse are 
embedded in noisy enforcement systems which produce some punishment of 
abusers, some punishment of perfectly innocent men, and the tolerated resid-
uum of abuse.78  The deterrent effects of the rules are therefore seriously compli-
cated.  They arise not only from the “hits” but also the “misses”—indeed, they 
arise as well from the perception of the ratio of hits to misses.  The deterrent ef-
fects arise, moreover, not only from the real circumstances that lead some cases 
to become “hits” and others to become “misses,” but also from ideologically 
saturated “causation” narratives (“she was asking for it”; “frat boys are suave 
 
 76. Note the exchange of danger supposed by this formulation.  Shifting the line between pun-
ished and tolerated abuse towards the latter shifts the burden of taking precautions against abuse 
from women to men.  That is, if we punish more abuse and tolerate less, then we lift some of the 
burden off of women to avoid abuse, and impose a corresponding additional burden on men.  This 
burden includes that of more compliance with anti-abuse rules: when we do this, men also end up 
with heavier burdens of protecting themselves from false and mistaken accusations of abuse, and of 
splitting their interests among themselves. 
 77. Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1169, 1173 (2001) [herein-
after Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique]. 
 78. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 134-38. 
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rapists”), the descriptive power of which is itself an object of political struggle.  
The properly legal question is how to design and enforce rules that get the 
“right” balance among punishments, immunities, and deterrences, but this is go-
ing to be hard.  (More on “deciding under conditions of extreme difficulty” be-
low.) 
This idea of law is almost entirely foreign to any work that commits itself to 
the male/female model or to cultural feminist tenets; it is even more unknown 
in queer theoretic work.  There, the institutional noisiness of legal enforcement is 
usually blinked, in favor of an idea of law as a prohibition or a right that is vin-
dicated in some sense merely by existing.  In MacKinnon’s more radical work, 
law imagined this way becomes the “maleness” of law: the capacity of its very 
neutrality and abstraction to vindicate male interests in a highly mystified way.79  
In her “rights” phase, it becomes the capacity of a legal prohibition or a right to 
instantiate, more or less unilaterally, “women’s point of view.”80  In cultural 
feminism, the tolerated residuum is a male right to be morally wrong; women’s 
right to be free of abuse, and the reform goal of complete and seamless prohibi-
tion of abuse, would reformulate law as the effective expression of feminist 
moralism; every rule change is seen as a moral dictat.  Even where queer theo-
retic texts question the monolithic picture of power and of norms that these un-
derstandings provide, they almost never put into question the accompanying 
picture of law.  Kennedy’s understanding of law—which, as we will see, is much 
more capacious for a postmodernizing fragmentation of reality than the idea, 
typically assumed in left humanities work on sexuality, of “the law” as a con-
solidated entity imposing its norms unilaterally on a social world made up sim-
ply of obedient and disobedient subjects—finds its precursors not in feminism 
or queer theory but in American legal realism.81 
Second, the real action is not in law per se, but in wildly differently inter-
ested players who participate in wildly complex social interactions, calibrating 
their own activities according to their perception of the balance of punishments, 
immunities and deterrences that the rules, as enforced, happen to produce.  
They engage in cost/benefit calculations and then engage in social interactions 
with other people doing the same.  This mutual calculatedness can be imagined 
as bargaining, and the players can be imagined as bargaining in the shadow of the 
law.  This term, taken from the title of a key contribution to legal studies by Rob-
ert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, carries the idea that social interactions 
happening far far away from the scene of legal enforcement—conceptually, geo-
graphically and narratively—are pervasively informed by the parties’ sense of 
what the law, with all its hits and misses, means for their pursuits.82  Kennedy 
uses the idea of bargaining in the shadow of the law to notice, for instance, that, 
if a woman perceives the tolerated residuum of abuse to expose her to the possi-
bility of abuse without protection ever, even once, it weakens her bargaining po-
 
 79. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 644-45, 655-58. 
 80. For a particularly consolidated statement, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Post-
modernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687, 688-89, 691-93 (2000). 
 81. For the traditions upon which Kennedy’s approach rests, see Kennedy, supra note 10, at 236-
37, n.9, n.12.  Put them together and you have a short list of classics in legal realism. 
 82. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Di-
vorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
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sition with this man now in a myriad ways: sometimes, possibly on average, and 
not necessarily in any single case, but surely more than would be the case if the 
tolerated residuum were smaller, it will induce her to dread being single more 
than men do; to take less desirable lovers than she otherwise would; to concede 
more to her partners during relationships than she otherwise would and than 
her partners concede in return; to regard breaking relationships off as more 
costly to her than she otherwise would and than her partners do in turn; to “pay 
more” for a breakup than she otherwise would or than her partners do; etc.83  
The tolerated residuum strengthens the bargaining position of abusive hus-
bands, of course, but also of perfectly lovely ones.  It alters the amount of batter-
ing that women take at home from bad men (upwards) and the amount of the 
housework they can extract from all men (downwards). 
Something like this analysis has been important in radical feminism and 
cultural feminism for a long time.  It has produced insights like “The State as a 
Male Protection Racket” and “the lesbian continuum”—the ideas that the threat 
of rape benefits all men at the expense of all women by requiring each woman to 
secure a single committed man to protect herself from all the other men84 and the 
idea that, faced with a life structured by bargaining from a position of overde-
termined weakness, women have more in common with each other, and against 
all men, than they do with their supposedly dearest heterosexual love objects. 85  
Even for feminists who balk at or pay no attention to MacKinnon’s expansive 
ontological and metaphysical claims for male dominance, this form of subordi-
nation-theory structuralism makes the male/female model seem basically 
“right.” 
Kennedy drops some flies into the feminist ointment, however, when he 
posits (my words, not his) that wildly differently interested players participate 
in wildly complex social interactions.  As we’ve seen in Part I above, the feminist 
penchant for convergence means that, when feminism thinks about what Ken-
nedy (following Mnookin and Kornhauser) calls “bargaining in the shadow of 
the law,” it persistently sees women and men, respectively, as consolidated so-
cial groups with fairly smooth, uninterrupted, and, inter sese, opposed interests.  
Kennedy punctures this smoothness, first, by insisting that some, many, men 
have an interest in reducing the tolerated residuum—not because they are good 
converts to cultural feminist normativity who would sleep better at night if they 
knew that all human beings were safer—but because they are erotically self-
interested heterosexual men who could be more restless at night if women knew 
it was safer to be sexy to them.86  Reducing the tolerated residuum would not 
only create conflicts of interest among men by requiring more of them to side 
with women against other men; it would also retilt the playing field in an al-
ready existing conflict of interest among men, one in which the abusers are ex-
 
 83. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 146-47. 
 84. Susan Rae Peterson, Coercion and Rape: The State as a Male Protection Racket, in FEMINISM AND 
PHILOSOPHY 360, 368-69 (Mary Vetterling-Braggin et al. eds., 1977). 
 85. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631 (1980). 
 86. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 138, 208-13. 
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tracting the social goods of women’s sexual safety, not only from women, but 
from men.87   
The next fly draws its pedigree from postmodern, pro-sex feminism, most 
explicitly the work of Butler and Frug and thus, indirectly, from Foucault.  Here, 
Kennedy agrees that the eroticization of domination has “taken” in the sense 
that human heterosexual life seems unimaginable without it, definitely in the 
sense that the eroticization of domination involves all men and all women in a 
highly dangerous and oppressive sexual system.  But the “seamless quality” of 
that system as it is described by the structuralist feminisms cannot account for 
“the fissures of gendered existence within liberal patriarchy.”88  They miss three 
“puzzling aspects of eroticized hierarchy”: the over-determined quality of male 
dominance (it does not seem to need sexuality to secure its place) (here we have a 
brief nod in the direction of socialist feminism); the capacity even for strong crit-
ics of male dominance to affirm the “egalitarian and even redemptive” quality 
of some heterosexual experience within the vocabulary of eroticized domination;89 
and “the persistence of resistance, compromise and opportunism as strategies 
for negotiating the regime, rather than buying into it without reserve, so that the 
image of a fully rationalized, totalitarian gender system seems paranoid.”90 
Before proceeding further into Kennedy’s argument, it might help to notice 
some similarities to Bersani’s, in the register of the queer critique of identity.  
Like Bersani, Kennedy insists that there are, in politics and in sexual life, a huge 
variety of highly particularized and interested sexual positions that are male, and 
in the course of the essay he performs himself as inhabiting many of them, at 
least in possibility.  So they both stake themselves very definitely to identity po-
sitions.  But also like Bersani, Kennedy insists that sexuality produces politics 
without sustaining simple identitarian framings like “gay men” and “heterosex-
ual men.”  In pretending otherwise, Bersani intones, “we have been telling a few 
lies”;91  in supposing that men (for example, social conservative and sexually lib-
ertine heterosexual men), or women (for example, social conservative women 
and butch lesbians), have undifferentiated stakes in the regulation of sexual 
abuse, Kennedy concludes, feminism mistakes its own interests.92  And like Ber-
sani, Kennedy deploys this fragmentation of identitarian interests not only 
against group consolidation—wildly differently interested players—but also against 
the simple consolidation of an interested self—participate in wildly complex social 
interactions.  At this point both Bersani and Kennedy draw upon social theoreti-
cal resources of high modernism—Freud and, in Kennedy’s case, Ferdinand de 
 
 87. Id. at 144. 
 88. Id. at 157. 
 89. To support this claim Kennedy cites a passage from MacKinnon that falls just a bit short of 
it: “Sex feeling good may mean that one is enjoying one’s subordination; it would not be the first 
time.  Or it may mean that one has glimpsed freedom, a rare and valuable and contradictory event.”  
MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 218.  A wonderful passage, but strictly speaking it does not affirm the 
egalitarian possibilities of women’s heterosexual experience; rather, in it MacKinnon rigorously 
maintains her stance of not knowing the difference between rape and a good fuck. 
 90. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 157. 
 91. Bersani, supra note 9, at 206. 
 92. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 181-85. 
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Saussure as well93—to produce a postmodernist explosion of the self and a 
highly paradoxical account of human sexual interests and welfare. 
We can see this fracturation if we follow Kennedy as he multiplies the pos-
sible meanings of women’s sexy dress.  He defines “sexy dress” semiotically, so 
that, for instance, a particular pair of women’s shoes might signal sexiness at a 
family dinner party or a church prayer meeting but not at a nightclub or even at 
work, and so that, if dress is sexy at all, it refers ultimately (let’s face it) to fuck-
ing.  The “meaning” of a particular act of sexy dressing is deeply contingent on 
the semiotics of locale and male/female performativity in which it occurs, as 
those are understood (that is, intended, experienced and interpreted) by the men 
and women involved.94 
Kennedy agrees with male/female model feminists and cultural feminists 
that a woman’s sexy dress can indicate her vulnerability to sexual abuse by men; 
indeed, in traditional conservative sexual morality, a woman who dresses sexy 
and is abused is actually understood to have “asked for it.”  Kennedy goes fur-
ther, and affirms that sexy dress invokes women’s and men’s capacity to be 
sexually excited by the possibility of abuse.95  But to follow male/female-model 
and cultural feminism at this point, and hold sexy dress to a monolithic meaning 
(women’s sexual objectification and subordination), to attach it by the copula to 
the eroticization of women’s actual, chronologically unbroken sexual subordina-
tion, is both “speculative and paranoid”—”not,” he is careful to add, “that it 
couldn’t be true”—but it need not be.96 
So, women’s sexy dress can “mean” sexual objectification and vulnerability 
in ways that are substantively related to women’s subordination.  But Kennedy 
construes Madonna’s Open Your Heart video to discover in sexy dress a splendid 
fissuring of power and gender. 
Here is a summary of his reading of the music video’s representation of 
sexy dress and the powers it organizes.  For men, it can refer to the erotic 
imagery that men deploy in masturbation, and thus, along with excitement, can 
produce in them a whole range of feelings that do not sound in domination—
dirtiness, shame, secrecy, confusion, guilt, fear, embarrassment and anxiety 
about getting caught.  It can refer to locales (red-light districts, tough urban 
settings) with working-class associations and thus produce in middle- and 
upper-class men not only excitement but the dread of getting hurt there.  It can 
refer to, or even make possible, a direct exercise of women’s sexual power over 
men—a power to grant and withhold, a power to overpower, a power to “drive 
men crazy.”  And it can refer to or enact out-and-out female defiance of 
patriarchal sexual codes, indifference to male needs and fears, male powers and 
threats; female sexiness as female sexual autonomy and invulnerability.  Of 
course, female sexual autonomy and invulnerability are modes of female 
existence that are highly prized in sex-positive feminism, so their emergence in 
 
 93. For Bersani’s investment in Freud, see LEO BERSANI, THE FREUDIAN BODY: PSYCHOANALYSIS 
AND ART (1986).  For Kennedy’s reliance on FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL 
LINGUISTICS (Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., Wade Baskin trans., P. Owen 1974), see Duncan 
Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991). 
 94. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 163-208. 
 95. Id. at 194. 
 96. Id. at 196. 
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the analysis provides Kennedy with a moment for convergence.  But he sticks to 
his identity position within male heterosexual interests by insisting that they 
might well provoke in some men, sometimes, a will to dominate or retaliate, and 
they might just also, for some men sometimes, provoke a sense of 
powerlessness, fear, doom, envy or disorientation.  They provide also to men the 
basis for pleasurable fantasies that are not exactly what male/female model 
feminism attributes to them, for instance, the fantasy of setting down the good 
man’s burden of being careful and protective; the fantasy of being absolved 
from worry about whether the woman really wanted it, had a good time, came; 
the fantasy of a borrowed self, of an introjected powerful female other, a self that 
is as narcissistic and as powerfully embodied as the sexy-dressing woman.  Of 
course the very same act of sexy dressing might actually mean, to the woman, that 
she has failed to produce any of those happy outcomes: it might be “shadowed 
by the possibility that no one, not one person, experiences it as she would 
want—that the whole audience consists of ‘dirty old men,’ abusers lying in wait, 
and critics who think she is a slut or politically incorrect or too old or not pretty 
enough or doesn’t really know how to do it right.”97 
Shame is deeply embroidered into this image of erotic life.  It has the place 
in Kennedy’s “queered” analysis that abjection does in Bersani’s.  And again like 
Bersani, though Kennedy acknowledges the pain that shame involves, he never-
theless represents it as intrinsic to female and male hetero-eroticism; wherever it 
appears it reverses the basic presupposition of the male/female model that, in the 
eroticization of domination, men and masculinity dominate women and femi-
ninity.  Men responding erotically to sexy dress (or to the nexus between some 
sexy dress and pornography) may experience not only a will to dominate 
women, but also loss of control, direct humiliation and a relinquishment of 
erotic responsibility—and all of these can produce the allure of subordination, a 
highly pleasurable eroticization of female domination; while women dressing 
sexy in order to accrue the corresponding powers may experience humiliation, 
not because they are eroticized by men, but because they aren’t. 
At this point Kennedy almost produces the uncertainty and will to para-
doxical irresolution that are crucial to Bersani’s most “queer” analytic moment: 
I think nonetheless that some of the time, some sexy dressers and some of their 
audience are engaged in pleasure/resistance in the interstices of the regime.  
They are eroticizing female autonomy. . . . 
This must be always an uncertain form of politics because the signifying woman 
may be doing more harm than good, feeding the conventional view in which the 
tease deserves what she gets and men get off on woman-wanting mixed with 
woman-hating.  For both men and women, the experience is compromised be-
cause it occurs within, is indeed dependent for its meaning on, the larger web or 
references to male sexual abuse of woman and male degradation in relation to 
them.  It is never just ‘the truth’ . . . that the experience is indeed pleasure/resistance 
rather than something else, something bad, instead.98 
 
 97. Id. at 206. 
 98. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Kennedy’s idea that some male/female interactions—even though they refer, 
through sexy dress, to male abuse of women—nevertheless involve not domina-
tion, but “pleasure/resistance in the interstices of the regime” is a Foucaultian 
one, drawing directly on the vocabulary of Volume One.99  As he explores the 
“fissures of gendered existence,” Kennedy here turns (quite appropriately, it 
seems to me) from MacKinnon’s top-down model of power, to an idea of its “in-
terstitial” form, and even to the formulation of “pleasure/resistance” operating, 
not against power from below, but from within it.  Moreover, he posits as the 
basic linguistic dichotomy against which male/female sexual semiotics are 
played out, not male sexual abuse of women and women’s subordination, but 
male sexual abuse of women and male degradation in relation to it.  In such a con-
text, finally, “[i]t is never just ‘the truth’” that an act of sexy dressing achieves 
pleasure/resistance or confirms women’s subordination in the eroticization of 
domination: Kennedy affirms “uncertain[ty]” at exactly the point in his argu-
ment where MacKinnon would know. 
I note with a certain reluctance that (again, and finally, like Bersani) Ken-
nedy draws back from the not-feminist implications of this formulation, cutting 
male/female model feminism and knowingness some slack that his own argu-
ment would, if followed through, deny them. Let me push the argument more 
decisively into an engagement with the unknowing dimension of postmodernist 
thought, and further into its trajectory towards Taking a Break from Feminism. 
The basic legal algorithm of the paper, as I have suggested, is cost-benefit 
policy analysis.  Determining that we want one legal rule about sexual abuse 
rather than another involves minimizing the tolerated residuum of sexual abuse 
and discouraging sexy dress on one hand, and maintaining the tolerated resid-
uum of abuse while engaging in sexy dress and eroticizing it on the other, until 
we “do more harm than good.”  As I have suggested, the resulting fracturation 
of the legal project is highly amenable to the postmodernizing complexification 
that sexual regulation, I think, requires.  But Kennedy doesn’t go all the way. 
The paper takes us carefully through the ways in which bargaining in the 
shadow of the law between men and women, performed as it is against the 
background of the tolerated residuum, starts from women’s weaker bargaining 
position and thus, not structurally but on average and over the whole range of 
bargains men and women strike, produces their subordination.  The analysis is 
grippingly convincing.  But Kennedy does not return to this calculus after estab-
lishing the ambiguities of male/female power.  If he had, he might have had to 
add that, if heterosexual men experience women’s sexual autonomy as a 
threat—not only their power to deny men something they want very much, but 
also their ability, in providing it, to humiliate, disorient, and abject them—then 
there is a second tolerated residuum of risk to take into account: men’s.  And he 
would have had to acknowledge that women can secure a bargaining advantage 
whenever men want them to produce the effect of bold, indifferent female sex-
ual autonomy and are willing to make concessions to get it.  On this side of the 
ledger, if Kennedy had filled it in, he would have said that men not only come 
into bargaining with women with a distinct source of bargaining disadvantage, 
 
 99. FOUCAULT, supra note 26, at 92-96, 157, 159. 
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but they also seek complex erotic goods, so that they might, over the full range 
of bargains that they make with women, find themselves in subordination. 
How would we ever know how to add it all up, balance it all out?  By put-
ting “the truth” in scare quotes, and mockingly demoting it as “just ‘the truth,’” 
Kennedy strongly suggests that we may be on the verge of an epistemic crisis 
here.  Too bad that Kennedy uses feminism to draw back from the brink.  Con-
sider the passage just quoted.  It posits a heterosexual interaction in which a 
woman’s sexy dress is experienced by her and perhaps even taken up by one or 
more men as “pleasure/resistance.”  Kennedy is right to say that it may also, 
elsewhere presumably, “feed[] the conventional view” that she “deserves what 
she gets” and has ratified male erotic misogyny.  If that happens, she may be 
“doing more harm than good”—a judgment about relative values that could be 
sustained only on feminist sexual-subordination premises.  And as the passage 
draws to a close, Kennedy seems to endorse those premises: “It is never just ‘the 
truth’. . . that the experience is indeed pleasure/resistance rather than something 
else, something bad, instead.”  In this formulation, the feminist construal can 
cast doubt on the Foucaultian one, but not the other way around.  The gesture 
hinges on “rather”—only one or the other can be true—and, within that dichot-
omy, if the harm occurs, the event was “instead” and “indeed” not pleas-
ure/resistance in the first place. 
The not-feminist queer theoretic move, I think, is to insist that these two 
understandings cast profound doubt on each other.  Thus the not-feminist queer 
theoretic project, taken in its purest form, would resist the way in which here, in 
petit point, and throughout the paper’s concluding arguments, the male/female 
model produces “facts” for policy balancing, while the claim that heterosexual 
interactions produce pleasure/resistance occupies the slippery grammatical 
status of hypothesis and evanescent speculation.  It would see a failure of fol-
low-through when, at points involving a contest between feminist and Foucaul-
tian construals of power as it plays out between men and women, the normative 
and epistemic weight ends up on the side of male/female model feminism.  And 
it would see that Kennedy lost an opportunity to explore the “fissures of gen-
dered existence” when he didn’t ask whether the erotic/power dynamics be-
tween “men” and “women” arise outside gender tout court. 
So let me gather together the various strands of Kennedy’s analysis of the 
“dark side” of sexy dressing and the semiotics of heterosexual desire, and say 
what I think he would have said if he hadn’t been working overtime to stay in 
alliance with Frug’s effort to mediate the conflict between sexual-subordination 
feminists on the one hand and sex-positive and postmodernizing feminists on 
the other.  As long as the semiotics of sexiness makes every sign contingent on 
all other signs in an ever-shifting set of cross-references; as long as “meaning” 
resides problematically in intention, experience and uptake; as long as men and 
women do find intense pleasure inside the eroticization of domination; as long 
as pleasure sometimes takes the form of pain, and pain of pleasure; as long as 
desire can extend its reach to shame; as long as gender as power-over is subject 
to complex psychic reversals; as long as the resulting highly volatile system is 
understood to provide the raw material both for domination and for “resistance, 
compromise, and opportunism”; as long as all of these conclusions about our life 
in sexuality hold, it could never be “just ‘the truth’” that the scenario we are 
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construing was only pleasure/resistance and not something bad as well, or only 
something bad and not pleasure/resistance as well.  “The truth” and “the real” 
are not the ground upon which we can base our cost/benefit assessments, but 
effects in a sexual semiosis that is pervasively riven with paradox and knowable 
only through the murky epistemes of desire and politics. 
Why does that logic sound “queer”?  I think (see Appendix) it’s because it 
is sex-positive, shame/abjection affirmative, irrationalist, and capable of seeing 
the paradoxical, fractured and/or “flipped” capacities in M, F, desire and 
power.  Surely approaching questions of sexual politics or sexual regulation 
with that logic would lead us strongly away from the equality-is-freedom, vic-
tim’s-truth model of legal reform that has become Catharine MacKinnon’s, and 
would alienate us quite completely from the legal moralism that characterizes 
cultural feminism.  A much better fit, it seems to me, is the neorealist picture of 
law set out in Sexy Dressing, understood as a setting for what Kennedy else-
where describes as “decisionism.”100  Here is a decisionist sentence: “Making de-
cisions about what legal rule we want to use in the domain of sexual abuse—or 
even which political direction to go in—is hard.”  Hard because sexuality is 
dark, unknown to us, riven by paradox and reversal.  Hard because legal rules 
operate in social contexts, not only of subordination-theory, but also of Foucaul-
tian power.  We might have to decide without knowing that our understanding 
of the situation is right, without knowing how our decision will play out, and 
even convinced that, in a system in which any decision will transfer some social 
goods from, say, women to men or men to women, there is no decision that we 
could possibly make that will not hurt vast numbers of real, actual people, pos-
sibly the very people on whose behalf we think we are acting.  One reason to 
bracket feminism as we struggle to decide is suggested by the gesture of queer 
theoretic yearning that Kennedy makes, and then interrupts in the name of 
feminism, in Sexy Dressing: presupposing male/female model or cultural femi-
nist “takes” on sexual abuse is precisely not deciding. 
C. What Next? 
So far I’ve tried to show that Queer Theory by Men both Takes a Break 
from Feminism and avoids some of its own analytic consequences by Cutting 
Feminism Some Slack.  Kennedy’s decisionism, moreover, suggests an analytic 
matrix—a specifically legal matrix, and one adequate to the neorealist and post-
modernizing views of the complexity with which legal rules and social actors 
interact—in which we might decide whether Taking a Break or Cutting Femi-
nism Some Slack is a good thing to do or not.  In the final section of this paper I 
propose to try that matrix out on an actual legal decision feminists and others 
have had to make: should we allow divorcing spouses to sue their spouses for 
intentional (or negligent) infliction of emotional distress?  My hope is that I can 
crisply demonstrate that certain costs and benefits of the rule choice at stake 
here can become visible only if we Take a Break from Feminism; and that some 
very weighty costs to some feminist projects might arise if we Cut Feminism 
(too much) Slack. 
 
 100. See Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, supra note 77, at 1147–89. 
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IV.  TWYMAN V. TWYMAN 
Sheila and William Twyman were married in 1969.  Sheila filed for divorce 
in 1985, and not long thereafter amended her claim to include a tort action that 
the trial court construed as a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  
The factual crux of the claim seems to have been that William had “intentionally 
and cruelly” imposed “deviate sexual acts” on her.101  I work through the details 
below; for now it is sufficient to know that the trial court found that these acts 
involved bondage and that William had attempted to coerce Sheila to perform 
them. 
The court awarded the divorce, divided the marital assets and granted 
Sheila an additional $15,000 damages for her emotional distress on the tort 
claim.102  William appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed, saying that negligent 
infliction of emotional distress was actionable in Texas and was a claim that 
could be sustained by spouse against spouse.103  Meanwhile, however, the Texas 
Supreme Court held in another case that no claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress was permissible in Texas.104  When the Texas Supreme Court took 
up William’s further appeal, a majority of the Justices, split into a plurality and 
several concurrences, remanded the case for a new trial on a new legal theory: 
intentional infliction of emotional distress was held to be actionable, even be-
tween spouses, in Texas.105  The remand seems to be motivated by two conclu-
sions common to enough Justices to sustain it: the facts in the record were suffi-
cient to support a reasonable factfinder’s finding that William had intentionally 
inflicted emotional distress on Sheila, and that Sheila was entitled to retry her 
case because she could not have known how to litigate it until the Texas Su-
preme Court’s opinion was handed down.106 
So the case was remanded on what amounts to a ruling that the facts in the 
record were sufficient to sustain findings: (1) that William’s conduct was “‘out-
rageous . . . beyond all possible bounds of decency . . . atrocious . . . and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized society’”;107 (2) (at this point there is some legal uncer-
tainty, so I include all the options considered important by various Justices) that, 
when he engaged in that conduct, he intended to cause Sheila severe emotional 
distress and/or he knew he might cause her severe emotional distress and reck-
lessly ran the risk, and/or he recklessly ignored the risk of emotional distress;108 (3) 
 
 101. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. 1993). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 621. 
 104. See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993). 
 105. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 620.  The opinions were divided this way: Justice Cornyn wrote the 
plurality decision and issued the majority’s remand order; Justice Gonzalez filed a concurring opin-
ion; Chief Justice Philips concurred and dissented in a separate opinion; Justice Hecht (joined by Jus-
tice Enoch) also filed a concurring and dissenting opinion; Justice Spector (joined by Justice Doggett) 
filed a dissenting opinion. 
 106. Id. at 620-21. 
 107. See id. at 621 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)). 
 108. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS does not include any requirement that the defendant 
knew of the risk or even that he recklessly ignored the risk of emotional distress.  See id. at 621 (quot-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)).  Justice Cornyn nevertheless supposes that the fact 
finder on remand would have to find that William had such knowledge or was reckless when he 
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that his conduct did cause; (4) Sheila’s severe emotional distress.109  No one dis-
puted that Sheila was “devastated,” etc.; the dicey questions seem to be: what 
was the outrageous conduct, exactly, and what causally linked it to Sheila’s dis-
tress. 
All the Justices who give us any facts agree that William first introduced 
“bondage” into his and Sheila’s sexual relationship.  We learn from Justice 
Hecht that both Sheila and William tied each other up in those early encoun-
ters;110 her willing participation in those scenes and the mobility of “top” and 
“bottom” roles in them, fall out of the narrative for all the remanding Justices.  
Sheila then told William that she had been raped before they married, and told 
him that she did not want to engage in sadomasochistic sex with him any more; 
the Justices represent this moment very differently.  There is no inconsistency 
between the Justices on the basic facts of the rape, however.  Sheila testified that 
she had been raped before her marriage, at knifepoint, had been cut with the 
knife and had feared for her life.111 
Some years later Sheila discovered that William was in psychotherapy and, 
confronting him to find out why, was told that he was having an affair with a 
woman who was willing to engage in bondage.  At this point he indicated the 
marriage was in crisis: as Justice Hecht put it, he told Sheila that “if she could 
only have done bondage, nothing else would have mattered.”112  As Justice Spec-
tor put it, “he told Sheila that if she would not satisfy his desires by engaging in 
bondage, there would be no future to their marriage.”113  Justice Hecht further 
tells us that: 
For the remainder of the year the couple sought counseling . . . . On their coun-
selor’s advice, William and Sheila discussed William’s bondage fantasies, and 
Sheila again tried to participate in bondage activities with William.  But she 
found the activity so painful and humiliating that she could not continue it.  
Their last encounter, which did not include bondage activities, was so rough 
that she was injured to the point of bleeding.114 
Like Justice Hecht, Justice Spector understands that it was these last bondage 
encounters, and not the final sexual event in which Sheila sustained gynecologi-
cal injuries, that are at the heart of Sheila’s claim to actionable mental distress: 
Sheila experienced “utter despair” and “devastation,” as well as physical prob-
lems—weight loss and, after one encounter, prolonged bleeding that necessi-
 
failed to think about it.  Id. at 623-24.  As Justice Hecht points out, the idea that the liability requires 
intentional conduct is significantly eroded by the “recklessness” proviso.  Id. at 630.  The same view 
of the underlying conduct that classifies it as “outrageous” could well supply all a fact finder needed 
to conclude that the defendant recklessly ignored the likelihood that it would produce distress.  In-
deed, “outrage” is “distress.” 
 109. Id. at 621. 
 110. Id. at 636. 
 111. Justice Cornyn tells us that Sheila was raped at knifepoint.  Id. at 620 n.1.  Justice Hecht tells 
us the same thing.  Id. at 636.  Justice Spector adds that Sheila was actually cut with the knife and 
placed in fear for her life.  Id. at 641. 
 112. Id. at 636. 
 113. Id. at 641. 
 114. Id. at 636. 
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tated gynecological treatment.  The pain and humiliation of the bondage activities 
caused her to seek help from three professional counselors.115 
It is the bondage, not the last night of rough sex, that the Justices continu-
ally return to as the crux of William’s conduct.  We are left, then, with this basic 
narrative configuration: William repeatedly solicited Sheila’s participation in 
bondage scenes; faced with the divorce threat, Sheila reluctantly but willingly 
engaged in them, decided during or after them that they were intolerable to her, 
also had some very rough sex which the Justices apparently agreed she did not 
claim was humiliating, and suffered intense anguish. 
So there are three fact clusters in the record which various Justices regarded 
as irrelevant, relevant but not legally sufficient, or legally sufficient to sustain 
findings that William’s conduct was outrageous etc., and/or that he had the suf-
ficient degree of intent to be responsible for the emotional distress that Sheila 
suffered.  First is William’s desire for and solicitation of sadomasochistic sex.  I’ll 
call this the “sadomasochistic solicitations.”  Second is Sheila’s narrative to Wil-
liam of a rape that occurred before the marriage and her refusal (apparently re-
scinded near the end of their life together) to engage in bondage for that reason.  
I’ll call this the “rape disclosure.”  The third element is William’s inabil-
ity/refusal to relinquish his kink, his pursuit of it with a lover and his telling 
Sheila, when she discovered that he was seeing a psychotherapist, that the mar-
riage would fail if she could not participate in bondage with him.  I’ll call this 
the “divorce threat.” 
For one Justice, the divorce threat and the sadomasochistic solicitations are 
crucial and the rape disclosure seemingly irrelevant.  Justice Gonzalez indicates 
that the element of “outrageousness” was fully met by William’s solicitation of 
and participation in bondage activities with her, “under the rationale that such 
activities were necessary to the future of their marriage.”116  He makes no refer-
ence to the claims that these solicitations, episodes or arguments had a severe 
emotional impact on her because of the rape, or that William should incur liabil-
ity for them because she had warned him that they would.  He almost suggests 
that the solicitation of mild sadomasochistic sex with a spouse, especially if you 
really need it and she later finds this out, is itself outrageous and can be pre-
sumed to cause any emotional distress that follows.  It is a draconian anti-kink 
stance and not intrinsically feminist (though some feminists would no doubt 
endorse it, for feminist reasons that do not appear to have motivated Justice 
Gonzalez). 
For the other Justices who reflect substantially on the facts, all three fact 
clusters—the sadomasochistic solicitations, the rape disclosure and the divorce 
threat—matter and there are indelible marks of feminism in the Justices’ under-
standing of their interrelation in a causal progress from William’s “intent” to 
Sheila’s distress.  They differ, moreover, in the inflections they give each of these 
clusters, so a close reading will be rewarding.  Justice Cornyn (writing the plu-
rality opinion concluding that the action for intentional infliction should be al-
lowed and the case remanded) summarized the record thus: “Sheila testified 
that William pursued sadomasochistic bondage activities with her, even though 
 
 115. Id. at 641 (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. at 626. 
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he knew that she feared such activities because she had been raped at knife-point be-
fore their marriage.”117  This logic must exclude the bondage scenes that happened 
before William knew about the rape.  Justice Hecht (who would have rejected all 
infliction actions as indeterminate and thus not capable of being brought within 
the rule of law)118 narrates the moment of disclosure thus: “She revealed to him 
that she associated the activities with the horrible experience of having been raped at 
knifepoint earlier in her life.”119  And Justice Spector (who would have endorsed 
a rule allowing negligent infliction actions because of the disproportionate harm 
insensitive men cause more emotionally alert women and who would not have 
remanded but rather affirmed the judgment for Sheila even on an intentional in-
fliction rule)120 basically repeats Justice Hecht’s narrative here: after William “in-
troduced bondage activities into their relationship after their marriage[,] Sheila 
told William that she could not endure these activities because of the trauma of having 
been raped several years earlier.”121 
Justices Cornyn, Hecht and Spector (though they agree about little else) 
agree that Sheila’s special sexual history was crucial to her claim, and the latter 
two (though they agree about almost nothing else) agree that it made her particu-
larly vulnerable to harm in sexual exchange with her husband.  They use a 
strange temporal locution—”the experience of having been raped,” “the trauma 
of having been raped”—that locates the moment of injury in a perpetual present.  
Sheila is always undergoing the experience of having been raped, always suffer-
ing the trauma of having been raped.  In much feminist rape discourse, this is 
exactly right.  Once raped, always raped.  Contemporary feminist rape discourse 
repeatedly insists that the pain of rape extends into every future moment of a 
woman’s life; it is a note played not on a piano, but on an organ.  Justice Spec-
tor’s cultural feminism probably supplies this understanding; Justice Hecht, 
who, as we will see, attempts to reconstitute Sheila as a responsible agent with 
considerable powers, resorts to it in a gesture that seems almost compensatory. 
At this point Justices Spector and Hecht part company, and as the latter 
departs from Justice Spector’s cultural feminist line I feel strongly tempted to 
follow him.  On the question “what did William know about Sheila’s likely emo-
tional reaction to a bondage solicitation,” Justice Hecht tells us that, after the 
first experiments with neckties, “Sheila told William she did not like this activity 
and did not want to participate in it further.”122  Strong, decisive, self-knowing.  
An agent.  But not a person with a plausible claim that her husband’s desire for 
what she did not desire constituted “intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  
Justice Spector, however, understands the disclosure quite differently: after the 
rape disclosure “William understood that Sheila equated bondage with her prior 
experience of being raped”; “Sheila told William that she could not endure these 
activities.”123  Once again Justice Spector deals in standard cultural feminist rape 
 
 117. Id. at 620 n.1 (emphasis added). 
 118. See id. at 634. 
 119. Id. at 636 (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. at 643. 
 121. Id. at 641 (emphasis added). 
 122. Id. at 636. 
 123. Id. at 641 (emphasis added). 
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tropes: the deathlike pall of sexual injury and the literal equation of every rape-
like event with rape itself.  If bondage reminded Sheila of her rape, it was the rape 
all over again; and because the rape was death, being reminded of it was also 
death: she could not endure it. 
And what about the divorce threat?  Justice Hecht gives it a somewhat pa-
thetic cast: “William told Sheila that if she could only have done bondage, noth-
ing else would have mattered.”124  None of the other renditions of this fact have 
anything like this wistful sound.  Justice Spector quotes the trial court, which 
found that William had “engaged in a continuing course of conduct of attempt-
ing to coerce [Sheila] to join in his practices of ‘bondage’ by continually asserting 
that [their] marriage could be saved” only if she participated in them.125  Justice 
Cornyn also quoted the trial court’s finding that William “attempted to emo-
tionally coerce [Sheila] in ‘bondage’ on an ongoing basis.”126  Perhaps this is 
where the rape-likeness of the last bondage scenes finally emerges: the threat of 
divorce is like the threat of a knife.  Under threats like this a woman loses her 
agency and, if she consents to sex, it is nevertheless coerced.  This, too, is a com-
pletely familiar element of feminist rape discourse.  Why so many feminisms 
want women to experience themselves as completely devoid of choice when 
they bargain their way past a knife by having sex they really really don’t want, I 
don’t know.  But wait!  Justice Spector has just extended this agency-less con-
struction of women to situations involving the threat, not of physical mutilation 
or death, but of divorce.  Divorce is represented as so life-threatening that, faced 
with the possibility of it, women cannot be regarded as agents. 
This image of male power and female subordination—the utter pathos of 
Sheila, submitting to sex with her husband that he wants but that they both 
know will humiliate and anguish her, all to save her marriage precisely to the 
author of her suffering—is of course not at all required by any particular strand 
of feminism.  Nor need feminism endorse or seek the remedy granted by the 
Texas Supreme Court in this case.127 
But can feminism accommodate a completely reversed image of the Twy-
mans’ marriage?  Imagine it: the utter pathos of William, begging for sex he 
can’t get from his wife, guiltily sneaking off to have it with another woman, 
whipped through round after round of psychotherapy to figure out why he is 
such a pervert and finally submitted to the public humiliation of testifying about 
his hopeless intimacies and suffering a published opinion deciding that his 
marital conduct is very likely outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of de-
cency, atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.  As against that, 
imagine: the astonishing powers of Sheila, laying down the moral law of the 
couple’s sex life, pursuing William like a Fury for breaking it and extracting not 
only a fault based divorce, but possibly also money damages specifically prem-
ised on her alliance with the state against him.  Imagine further: Twyman as a 
 
 124. Id. at 636. 
 125. Id. at 641. 
 126. Id. at 620 n.1. 
 127. Brenda Cossman, Dan Danielsen and Tracy Higgins give acute readings of the ways in 
which the Justices incorporate various forms of feminism in their legal and policy calls and amply 
demonstrate that many feminisms would object to the outcome in this case.  See Cossman et al., supra 
note 1. 
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background family law rule that husbands with enduring ineradicable desires 
for sex that their wives find humiliating must either stay married to those wives 
or, if they seek a divorce (which they might well want to do simply to remarry 
and have nonadulterous sex with women who do not find their desires humili-
ating), pay a heavy tax in shame, blame and cash.  Can feminism acknowledge 
that women emerge from the court’s decision with new bargaining power in 
marriage and a new role as enforcers of marital propriety? And can feminism 
see how costly this “bargaining endowment” might be to women, who can tap 
into it only if they find the sex in question painful and humiliating?  Can femi-
nism read the case as male subordination and female domination—and still as 
bad for women? 
Very possibly.  There might well be a place for feminism that carries a brief 
for F, without presupposing M>F.  I think this is where Brenda Cossman and 
Tracy Higgins see the possibility for substantial gains for feminism.128  But my 
project here is to expose some of the distinctive attractions of Taking a Break 
from Feminism.  To do that, I’m going to reduce Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the 
Genealogy of Morals129 and Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, Volume One130 to a 
set of counter-hypotheses and offer brief re-readings of Twyman v. Twyman de-
signed to exploit the explanatory power of the resulting hypotheses.  I propose 
to read each text as forcefully as possible away from the many possible deploy-
ments of it within feminism, even the most minimal feminism I know, which is, 
as I’ve said, basically M/F, M>F, and carrying a brief for F.  It is very important 
to note that, when I turn to Twyman to re-read its facts, as much as possible, to 
exemplify the hypotheses I’ve generated from Genealogy of Morals and Volume 
One, I am not making any claims about the real human beings Sheila and Wil-
liam Twyman; instead, working from the highly artful constructions of them 
that we receive from the Justices of the Texas Supreme Court, I’m going to 
bracket feminism and reconnnect all the dots à la Nietzsche and à la Foucault. 
First, let’s consider the moralistic character of Sheila’s project with William.  
Note that she was not content to seek a fault-based divorce and apparently did 
not seek damages or pursue criminal charges against him for that last night of 
sex between them that left her bleeding.  Instead, she sought a judge’s finding 
that—through the sadomasochistic solicitations, the rape disclosure and the di-
vorce threat—William engaged in conduct that was outrageous, beyond all pos-
sible bounds of decency, atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.  
What can we say about Sheila’s decision if we take Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Mor-
als as our theoretical ground?  In the following extractions, I rewrite the “slave 
revolt in morals”131 as if it were achieved not over the broad sweep of human 
history but by an individual: 
1. The historical starting point of slave morality is the slave’s perception of 
himself as dominated and as suffering under the will of the master.  He sees his 
 
 128. See id. 
 129. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS: A POLEMIC (Douglas Smith trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1887). 
 130. FOUCAULT,  supra note 26. 
 131. NIETZSCHE, supra note 129, at 22. 
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as a passive location in the world: the master is active; and in his passivity the 
slave suffers. 
2. Though originally the slave could have understood his suffering as bad and 
the master’s activity as good (and could have sought to be active too), this is not 
what happens.  Instead, he translates the power relation into a moral one: he is 
good and the master is evil.  It is now a relationship of dominated virtue and 
dominating vice.  Morality is born as a covert mechanism of power, a subli-
mated form of domination. 
3. This translation removes any reason for the slave to experience himself as 
having a will.  Will is now evil.  The rage of the slave against his suffering—his 
own will to power—is now denied. 
4. His will, his activity, do not go away, though.  Instead, translated yet again 
into ressentiment, they are rerouted both out, against the master, in gestures of 
meek but biting vengeance, and in, against the slave himself, in a new form of 
suffering, under the whip of his own morality, the new innerness of a guilty con-
science. 
5. Slave morality wreaks itself with splendid sadism on the master, and with 
stupefying intensity it also punishes the slave himself for his own active im-
pulses—impulses without which the whole terrible cycle would never have 
started.  It establishes a third human class, the priestly class, with powers that 
are made more uncanny because they are waged under the sign of weakness 
and use not the pathetic devices of physical coercion but the intimate stringen-
cies of conscience and inner pain.  “Bad air!  Bad air!”132 
It is not at all difficult to re-read Sheila Twyman as the intense sufferer and 
wielder of slave morality.  Her rapist, that blond beast, could have been her en-
emy, but (possibly with the assistance of feminism) became her master.  His 
power to rape her at knifepoint became a, if not the, central fact of her life.  Ex-
periencing herself as utterly dominated, she determined to oppose him with the 
power of the weak: he was bad, not in the sense that he acted inimically to her 
will, but in the sense that he was evil.  And her moral project of punishing him, 
in its ferocious will for revenge, failed to notice that William was—well—a dif-
ferent guy.  Wielding the moral code of good sex, Sheila made William grovel, 
but she also suffered intensely herself.  Justice Spector (of course) provides us 
with the gruesome details: Sheila “experienced ‘utter despair’ and ‘devasta-
tion,’” lost weight, accepted sex with William that left her bleeding: “the pain 
and humiliation of the bondage activities caused her to seek help from three 
professional counselors.”133  (It is an amazing detail that Justice Spector’s and Jus-
tice Hecht’s Sheila seems to find sex with neckties, but not sex that produces gy-
necological injuries, to be painful and humiliating.  A Nietzschean reading of 
this discrepancy would propose that this Sheila was devoid of a self-
preservative impulse, could not attend to the well being of the body, so devoted 
was she to quickening of her wounded soul.)  She experienced her self as utterly 
 
 132. Id. at 28. 
 133. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 641. 
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powerless, utterly broken, and the more intensely she sought and obtained 
vengeance on William, the more deeply she became embedded in the stringen-
cies of the suffering that justified it. 
I can think of many reasons why Taking a Break from Feminism so as to be 
able to read the case in this way is a good idea.  If this reading of her is right—
and the reading itself is no empirical warrant—I have several important political 
insights I would not have without it.  First, it brings strongly to my attention the 
possibility that Sheila Twyman is no ally of mine.  Second, it warns me to think 
of her as no weakling, but rather as a formidable enemy who will pursue her 
goals with fierce drive.  Third, it suggests that she nevertheless suffers terribly 
with every new access of subordinated sensibility.  And fourth, it helps me to 
see that feminism might be partly responsible not only for her power, but also for 
the terrible suffering that grounds it. 
But maybe my ressentiment of Sheila’s ressentiment is torquing my reading 
too much.  Let’s look for something milder, something that suspends completely 
the idea that power must take the form of domination and subordination and 
something that lifts us out of moralism and the temptation to fall into a moralis-
tic rage against it.  As I read Volume One of Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, it 
offers some theoretic hypotheses that differ very strikingly from those I have at-
tributed to Unitedstatesean feminism134 and to Nietzsche.  In what follows I pro-
ceed as though Foucault’s hypotheses about power were simple and straight-
forward rather than contradicted, ambivalent and in tension throughout this 
text.135 
Four key points: 
1. For the Foucault of Volume One, the task was to imagine power not as 
the relation of dominance and subordination, but as a highly fragmented 
and temporally mobile “field of force relations.”  Power could be micropou-
voir: it could achieve vast social and consciousness effects not by dropping 
down on people from on high, but by being constantly moved about 
among them; and not only through physical violence, but also through 
formations and reformations of the possibilities for organized experience.  
Discourses. 
2. For the Foucault of Volume One, power was not necessarily bad.  It 
might be pouvoir, the capacity to create effects, rather than puissance, the ca-
pacity to dominate or coerce. 
3. For the Foucault of Volume One, sexuality emerged historically as a dis-
 
 134. Of course I know that there have been many efforts, some quite successful, to converge Vol-
ume One into feminism.  I nevertheless offer this divergentist reading, trusting that pushing femi-
nism and Foucault as far apart as I can will also be productive, albeit in a different way. 
 135. Thus Foucault describes power as both sovereign and fragmented; liberation as both desir-
able and a ruse; historical forms of power and social life as both superceded and enduring.  For a bril-
liant reflection on the nonpropositional quality of Volume One, see Andrew Parker, Foucault’s 
Tongues, 18 MEDIATIONS 2 (1994).  For some perhaps adequate reflections on Foucault’s ambivalent 
periodizations, see Janet E. Halley, Bowers v. Hardwick in the Renaissance, in QUEERING THE 
RENAISSANCE 15 (Jonathan Goldberg ed., 1994). 
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course and produced as its effect the people we are—people who think that 
our lives crucially involve knowledge of our deepest sexual selves.  There 
is something excruciating and “stuck” about this; a more mobile relation-
ship to sexuality not as a truth but as a practice might be better.  Foucault 
did not imagine liberation, but rather a perpetual search for the rearrange-
ment of powers in the social and experiential fields. 
4. Very few of the chief discourses of sexuality in the modern era turn in 
any sustained way on M/F.  None of them bears the mark of sustained 
male dominance.  Instead, the organization of knowledge and knowledge 
practices are far more likely to be the way in which power constitutes sexu-
ality.  These will not oppress particular persons or groups, so much as pro-
duce differentiations within the population, spread it out in mobile but pat-
terned arrays.  Biopower. 
These hypotheses would allow us to Take a Break from Feminism in two ways: 
they propose that sexuality can be understood without reference to M and F; 
and they propose that power can be understood without >. 
So let’s read the Twyman facts as if these hypotheses were the only ones 
available.  The first thing that “goes” is the presumption, silently carried along 
in all the opinions of the court, that Sheila Twyman has a meaningful moral 
claim that William’s conduct was wrong.  The question addressed by the Jus-
tices is whether that claim is legally cognizable; Justice Hecht comes closest to the 
claim that the power relationships between husband and wife are indeterminate, 
but even he fell for the “trauma of having been raped” line.  Reading the case as 
if it were an example of how right Foucault’s hypotheses in Volume One could 
be, however, requires us to give that presumption up. 
One of the things that then immediately emerges is the intense, and for-
mally almost identical, sexual pathos of both Shiela and William.  Both are com-
mitted to the idea that they have deep, inner, injured sexual selves beyond 
which they cannot move one micron and which they must enact with near-fatal 
completeness.  William must live out the affliction of a perverse implantation, a 
deeply resisted fetishistic desire.  He is a classic subject of the psychiatrization of 
perversions.  Sheila must live out the affliction of rape trauma.  Rape trauma is 
her deep inner truth, and her experiential life must make it manifest.  In a terri-
ble way, William and Sheila are perfectly matched to provoke the complete 
manifestation of their diametrically opposite desires, but oddly, this is because 
they are basically the same. 
Moreover, Foucault always seems to think that this experience of deep in-
ner truth is introduced into modern consciousness by a discourse—a 
power/knowledge—that imposes it on us while distracting us from the real ac-
tion, the real place where power connects with sexual life.  The suffering of the 
shamed fetishist is pathetic—indeed, it is cruel and quite one of the terrible 
wrongs inflicted on the tremulous human spirit by the psychiatric discourse of 
sexual truth; and the suffering of the rape survivor is similarly pathetic—indeed, 
it is cruel and quite one of the terrible wrongs inflicted on the tremulous human 
spirit by the feminist discourse of sexual truth.  But both are distractions from 
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the real game, the real place where power meets the population. (This is Fou-
cault’s paranoid structuralism.) 
And where might we look in the Twyman facts for a warrant of the hy-
potheses of Volume One?  We are looking for something broadly regulatory, not 
M/F, and capable of complex biopoweristic and micropoweristic deployments.  
I propose marital monogamy.  Marriage provides spouses with an amazing 
power over each other: the power to perform (and inflict), and to prohibit (and 
punish), infidelity.  The monogamy rule and all the possible ways of breaking it 
provide rich social scripts, carefully elaborated at every level of cultural detail.  
Those scripts provide many ways of seeing a relationship of “power over” in the 
Twyman facts.  It is very easy to say that William has breached his promise of 
sexual continence, indulged in gratifications inconsistent with adult self-
discipline and decent regard for Sheila’s dignity, and cracked one of the build-
ing blocks of civilization.  Also easy to articulate is an idea that he has unleashed 
the brute force of sexual yearning against the fragility of civilization.  But we 
could see the subordination as running the other way: William enacts that im-
memorial figure, the Hapless Adulterer; he is the helpless bumbling dupe of a 
dozen trite tropes in the adultery script; the deep purpose of his affair was real-
ized only when Sheila discovered it and gained the upper hand; Sheila as the 
wronged wife, the enforcer of marriage vows, fiercely restores the fidelity rule to 
its proper place, with the avid assistance of almost every judge involved in the 
case. 
But let’s try one more time, for a third reading without a victim and a vic-
timizer, without dominance and submission, without M/F—but with power.  
What if the struggle between the two over William’s infidelity—their divorce 
had been pending for eight years by the time the Texas Supreme Court re-
manded the case for a new trial!—was for both of them a paroxysm of intimacy, a 
sustained crescendo of erotic interrelatedness, which, if it should ever end, 
would leave both of them aimless and lonely to the last degree?  Would that be a 
benefit or a cost of a monogamy rule? 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
So, why should we Take a Break From Feminism?  Here would be some 
decisionist responses to that question, couched in terms of the Twyman case and 
its re-readability. 
It might be that these alternative readings of the facts recorded in Twyman 
just don’t have any real-world plausibility.  Maybe Sheila is never the fomenter 
of slave morality; maybe Sheila and William never seek love in power without 
domination, suffering without subordination, in the cruel coils of divorce.  There 
is both strength and danger in framing the possibilities described by these read-
ings.  Only if we articulate and explore them, will we ever look into the world 
and see if it matches them.  Our political desires and projects could be signifi-
cantly rerouted, in very good ways, if we found a match: noticing that slave 
moralistic Sheila Twymans are not my allies has meant a profound reorientation 
of my feminism and my stance towards feminism, one that I think has been very 
helpful to me.  I admit there is danger here too, in the form of a spiral: if our 
axiom is “I’ll see it when I believe it,” theory can change reality by changing 
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what we can notice in it; and maybe feminism is right to close its eyes.  As I’ve 
suggested, I’m strongly inclined to think otherwise. 
And maybe there is something terrifying about losing one’s grip on a 
“moral compass” or in admiring a cruel marriage rule because people can use it 
for intense crazy masochistic love.  Very possibly critical disorientation is an un-
affordable luxury, especially in times, like these, of acute consolidation of con-
servative power.  Again, I’m strongly inclined to think otherwise; and hope my 
hunch turns out to be right. 
The intersections of the erotic with power and pain might just not always 
line up under the minimal terms required by feminism today (M/F, M>F, and 
carrying a brief for F).  But if these are possible features of our world—if even 
only some Sheila and William Twymans are like that, or even if some possible 
Sheila and William Twymans are like that only some of the time—it would be a 
good thing for us (here I speak to left, sex-positive, postmodernizing lovers of 
justice) to consider the possibility and take it into account.  We’ll never know: our 
theory predetermines what we can know.  But we could decide under the inevitable 
condition of not knowing with a wider scope of political sympathies and a finer 
calibration of the perverse ways in which desire—everyday desire, the desire of 
entirely normal people—encounters legal rules. 
(Appendix on page 50.) 
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APPENDIX 
There is no consensus on the essential or even characteristic attributes of 
queer theory.  For a while, in the early days of the project, anyone willing to be 
called “queer” was, by acclamation, entitled to the term; after all, association 
with the sobriquet could ruin your career and if you were willing to risk paying 
that price to develop the work, other players tended to cede you a lot of author-
ity to define it.  A strong bias in the project against field territorialization, “cate-
gories” and rules generally also led to many utopian statements that queer the-
ory would be the first enduring academic enterprise that had no internal 
regulatory ambitions, that would be forever open, exploratory, self-transforming 
and new.  The heyday of these antidefinitive norms seems to have passed; while 
being associated with “queer theory” continues to ruin many academic careers, 
it is also making others; and the idea of queer theory as an intellectual perpetual 
motion machine seems to be well advanced into its first half-life.  Things are set-
tling down; it is no longer intrinsically funny—as it was in 2000—to ask “What 
Was Queer Theory?”136 
While writing about Is the Rectum a Grave? and Sexy Dressing, I asked my-
self again and again: Why do I regard these texts as “queer theory”?  I was aim-
ing for a list of (Aristotelian, again) essential characteristics, like the ones I have 
deduced from feminism.  So far the list is maximalist: it stipulates for a lot, and 
so would deny the moniker “queer” to many projects that now claim it.  Still, 
unlike M/F, M>F, and carrying a brief for F, these essential characteristics re-
semble tendencies rather than conceptual, descriptive or normative commitments.  
And some projects seem to me to be “queer” even if they don’t manifest all of 
them. 
Queer theory is: 
 
Sex affirmative.  As I’ve suggested, we probably wouldn’t have queer theory 
if there had not been the need for articulate pro-sex opposition to cultural 
feminist moralism and to male/female model regulatory ambitions (e.g., 
antipornography ordinances). 
 
but also, 
 
Shame affirmative.  In its sex affirmations, queer theoretic work is curious 
about, involved in and indeed often positively affirmative with respect to 
shame and abjection.  I see two interesting consequences of this “bent” in 
queer theory. 
 
! It is not sex affirmative in the cultural feminist sense that it has a norma-
tive definition of “good sex” which it promotes to the detriment of “bad 
sex.”  Rather, it ends up affirming sex “dark side and all.”  Deeply ap-
preciative, therefore, of MacKinnon’s determination to construe sex, 
 
 136. When Neville Hoad did so in 2000, the query had more or less the form: “What happened to 
tomorrow?”  Personal Communication with Neville Hoad (February 11, 2000). 
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from wall to wall, in terms of power and domination (though, because 
of its critique of identity, unable to accept her structural rendering of 
sexual power as male/female and top/down at all times, everywhere).  
This characteristic makes it very difficult for queer theory to “know” 
how to distinguish rape from habitual, Sunday afternoon, missionary 
position, marital intercourse: MacKinnon had this problem too, but for 
other, distinct reasons. 
 
! Shame affirmativity makes queer theoretic work highly liable to contra-
diction in all its affirmative projects.  It is not possible to affirm one’s 
shame—even descriptively, much less normatively—except on some 
paradoxical register. 
 
And so queer theoretic work tends also to be 
 
Irrationalist.  Not only with respect to its affirmative stance towards the 
shame/abjection that awaits us in sex, but in general and overall, queer 
theoretic work seeks and values paradox, contradiction, catachresis, crisis.  
This trend in queer theory borrows heavily from the postmodern effort to 
put “enlightenment rationality” under historicizing critique—an effort that 
is represented in this study by Foucault and Neitzsche, but which could eas-
ily involve us in genealogical explorations of Immanuel Kant, Jacques Der-
rida and the postmodern Socrates.137  Symptoms are: utopian about “nega-
tive capability”; appreciative of a good mise en abysme; eulogistic in its use of 
the term “problematic.”  Work in this tradition will try to be at least partly 
immune to the liberal command to be rational; it will risk explorations and 
elaborate ideas that might impede “progress,” etc., will face up to some 
really painful experiences of uncertainty, disorientation and irresolution.  At 
its worst, this characteristic can lead queer theory into positions that are 
bratty, disengaged, narcissistic, idiotically dedicated to puer senex perform-
ances of the enfant terrible.  At its best, this characteristic holds out promise 
for intellectual, political and social revival of radical and critical practices. 
 
and 
 
Affirming practices/performativity/mobility, disaffirming identities/essence/sta-
bility.  Before launching on this project, I had always thought that the cri-
tique of identity was the definitive feature of queer work.  Formulations like 
Sedgwick’s (feminism presupposes a heterosexist conceptual order; gay 
identity is anti-gay)138 and Butler’s (feminism exists to contest the very man-
date of women’s existence as such)139 are nearly definitively queer; and else-
 
 137. On Immanuel Kant, see, e.g., Michel Foucault, What Is Critique, in THE POLITICS OF TRUTH, 
(Sylvère Lotringer & Lysa Hochroth eds., 1997); on Jacques Derrida, see, e.g., BARBARA JOHNSON, 
THE CRITICAL DISTANCE (1981); and on the postmodern Socrates, see, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Plato’s 
Pharmacy, in DISSEMINATION 61 (Barbara Johnson ed., 1981). 
 138. SEDGWICK, supra note 12. 
 139. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 12. 
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where, from David Halperin’s One Hundred Years of Homosexuality (giving 
homosexuality, and thus heterosexuality, a very recent birthday)140 to Dan 
Danielsen’s and Karen Engle’s After Identity (looking forward over the cur-
rent identity-saturated landscape for a politics framed in other terms),141 
really left gay work consistently regards homosexual identity as one of the 
most subtle, pervasive and constitutive forms of homosexual suffering.  
Nevertheless queer theoretic work—including work by every single person 
just named—pervasively respects the rich linguistic power of sexual orienta-
tion and gender identities, and often affirms them descriptively, strategi-
cally and even normatively.  Perhaps the queer appetite for paradox sus-
tains this contradiction; perhaps we just haven’t, maybe even we can’t, think 
it through completely. 
 
So the anti-identitarian impulse that seems to me essential to the project has 
complex, not simple manifestations.  I would now say that queer work will 
be more interested, descriptively and normatively, in practices than identi-
ties, in performativity than essences, and in mobility than stabilities.  That is, 
 
! it will be less affirmative of gay identity, which it frequently merely tol-
erates as a strategic and historical contingency, than of intense cathexes 
on sexual practices and affective states like desire, abjection, vigor, etc.; 
 
 and 
 
! it will be less interested in and affirmative of gay male and lesbian sepa-
ratist identity or various heterosexual subject positions as such than of 
gender performativity against, across and within them; identity itself be-
comes a practice; 
 
 and 
 
! with respect to both sex acts and gender performativity, it will tend to 
affirm mobility over fixity, though this tendency always leads a queer 
theoretic project to contradict its anti-identitarian aspirations by turning 
mobility itself into a new, highly regulatory identity or a model for all 
fixities to envy. 
 
And, finally, queer theoretic work wants to be 
 
Politically engaged towards the left.  Left/progressive/liberal in political orien-
tation.  If I’m right that what now bears the label “queer theory” can trace its 
genealogy back to (inter alia of course) pro-gay and feminist sexual libera-
tion movements of the 1960s and 1970s and gained a strong raison d’étre in 
the need for left resistance to the sexual regulatory projects of male/female 
 
 140. DAVID HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1990). 
 141. DAN DANIELSEN & KAREN ENGLE, AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE (1995). 
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model and cultural feminism, that does not commit it in any way to a strong 
theory of the state or stance towards, say, libertarianism or rights.  Nor does 
its affiliation with postmodernism and critique commit it to nihilism and po-
litical paralysis.  Is the Rectum a Grave? rightly insists that affirming sex, 
“dark side and all,” has very obscure and indeterminate consequences for 
political affiliation and initiative—but that does not mean it has no conse-
quences.  I propose Kennedy’s neorealist, postmodernizing decisionism as a 
way we could figure out those consequences and make the decisions they 
press upon us every day. 
 
That’s how I want to see it, at the moment, anyway. 
 
